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Remarks Occasioned by
the Late Conduct of Mr. Washington, As President of the United States. |
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REMARKS
OCCASIONED BY THE LATE CONDUCT
OF
MR. WASHINGTON,
AS
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
_________
M.DCC.XCVI.
_________________________________
PHILADELPHIA:
PRINTED FOR BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BACHE,
No. 112, MARKET-STREET.
1797.
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[COPY-RIGHT SECURED ACCORDING TO LAW.] |
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ADVERTISEMENT
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IT is not easy to excuse to the
wise and good, the delay which has occurred in publishing observations like
the present. At an earlier season, the measure might have been
censured by a certain party, as tending to excite the resentment of France;
but this party, which has not feared to give the sole cause for this
resentment, will always object to what opposes them. The American
nation (for we fondly call it such, while Mr. Washington yet permits us to
believe in the existence of the present federal Union;) would have judged
more justly. On the side of France, it would have allowed the possible
existence of persons with talents sufficient for comprehending the interests
of that country, when attention was drawn to them by obvious insults upon
the feelings of Frenchmen; and on the side of America it would have
concluded that the truth could never be told too soon, too widely, or too
forcibly.
But the times have overpassed these puny scruples,
France has at length closed the generous conflict between the impression of
ancient sentiments and a sense of recent wrongs. She has seen that
nothing can regain a party become British from the triple tie of their
hopes, their fears, and their habits. She perceives that America, if
it remains a nation, must soon call for an American system of
government; and for this moment, whether under the present or a new federal
constitution, she steps aside to wait. --The French Executive
Directory then, which towards all other countries has conducted itself with
a dignity more than Roman, will no longer condescend to be subservient to a
party in America, at the moment when she is humbling England, the
very country upon which |
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this party depends. It has learned the overwhelming power of
grand political principles and the final inefficacy of British gold, in its
own history and in that of America; and it trusts to the same even still
occurring in America; knowing in the interval, that all power added to
men who are unwise, only enlarges their sphere of doing wrong.
By this decision of France, a decision which the
influence and good sense of Mr. Monroe at Paris so long protracted, the
privilege of speaking (doubly bought by intervening silence) has returned
incontestibly to every one. The honest man who uses it, has the poor
consolation then of being permitted at present to seek to remedy what
it would have been more becoming had he attempted to prevent.
Although the design of these remarks is to prove
the want of claim in Mr. Washington either to the gratitude or confidence of
his country, the friends of this gentleman will be disappointed, if they
hope to discover any thing in the language of them inconsistent with
propriety. They will have a more difficult talk in defending their
patron therefore, than they are probably prepared to meet; namely, to answer
truth and argument, conveyed with candor on the one side and with firmness
on the other.
Two circumstances remain to be noticed respecting the
following work. --The one, that the Appendix is by no means confined
to dry documents, but contains new observations: --The other, that although
words are every where faithfully cited, yet liberties occur in
placing the italics and points in our extracts; which is
designed either to save the trouble of express comments, or to preserve
uniformity. The style however of Mr. Washington, which at times
deviates from strict rules, was not always susceptible of the advantage in
these respects which it was certainly intended to give it. |
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REMARKS, &c.
__________________
THE executive government of the
United States of America has lately exhibited singular proceedings. --A
judge sent off from his tribunal to England, to negotiate a commercial
treaty; the federal Senate expunging a principal condition of this treaty,
before they ratified it; the President ratifying it against his sentiments
(merely from suspicion of the use of bribery by the French*, though he might
have been certain of the use of it by the English;) the federal House of
Representatives withholding the sums necessary for fulfilling the
stipulations of the treaty; the merchants caballing against their suspensive
vote; and the House of Representatives with stern reluctance at length to a
certain degree completing their share in this rash and dishonourable
transaction; such are a part of the late American politics. --The House of
Representatives indeed had before it a painful option between bad and worse,
from which it was impossible to escape with reputation; for the dilemma was
so mischievously compounded, that it was not a contest between honour and
interest, which had admitted of easy decision; but honour as well as
interest stood compromised on both sides.
The result, it is to be hoped, will produce an
amendment of the federal Constitution, to the vices of which the present
crisis is owing. --Young governments like young children are prone to
imitation; and the American federal government has had at once the passion
and the faculty for copying the fears and the usurpations of the governments
of Europe. It has thus allied together terror and presumption from
seeing that the monarchies and aristocracies of Europe are extravagant
enough to connect them on their side. We see the excuse however for
the mistake of the governments in Europe. Their usurpations
were habitual previous to the promulgation of democratical principles; but
their imitators in America suppose, that
*See A Vindication
of Mr. Randolph's Resignation; of which more will be said hereafter. |
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the American democracy will give away its rights at a time when the strong
assertion of these rights occasions their own alarms.
One of the usurpations which at one period was
meditated by their party as a remedy to its fears, was that of rearing up
again the fragments of the British throne in America*, and placing upon it
Mr. George Washington. This personage indeed began to assume the tone
of a king in his public speeches, precisely when Louis XVI was obliged to
cease the practice; and the pomp gratified the Americans, as a symbol of
national importance, which might familiarize foreign powers to their new
position, and thus produce various practical benefits. The American
chief however had principally in view upon this occasion to obtain
consequence in his own favor. He accordingly ended, as we shall find,
in making his government subordinate to his passions. Men of extensive
reputation at length refusing to serve with him, he has surrounded himself
with ministers and other agents before little known; some of whom, in return
for an accommodating temper, appear to be making a property of their
employer. Certain to find in America an enemy to such proceedings, Mr.
Washington and his immediate followers have renounced their connections of
gratitude with France, to form connections of intrigue with England.
They think that it depends upon foreigners, what shall be the politics of
the American people; and that the temper
*Posterity will hardly believe
this fact. There are however too many documents on the subject for
informed men to dispute it. The conversation has been current at
New-York and Philadelphia, and among some persons most attached to Mr.
Washington.
The following circumstance is vouched for by Mr.
Randolph in his Vincidation. Mr. Fauchet [the French minister in
America] had heard the charges made in public discourses that some
members of the [American] government considered our Constitution as a
mere stepping stone to something else; not less than a monarchy, which might
not be so friendly to a French republic, as an American republic.' Mr.
Randolph adds as follows, in a note. 'Extract from the Instructions
to Col. Monroe when he went to France as Minister Plenipotentiary of the
United States which were approved by the President [Mr. Washington.']
"If we may judge from what has been at different times uttered by Mr.
Fauchet, he will represent the existence of two parties here irreconcilable
to each other; one republican and friendly to the French revolution; the
other monarchical, aristocratic, Britannic, and anti-Gallican: that a
majority of the House of Representatives, the people, and the President, are
in the first class; and a majority of the Senate in the second. If
this intelligence should be used, in order to inspire a distrust of our good
will to France, you will industriously obviate such an effect, &c.:"
Thus far Mr. Randolph.
We ourselves accuse not Mr. Washington as having
originated, or even participated in this design of making a
monarch of him; yet his late conduct and the certainty that the project was
favoured by various flatterers who had intimate access to him cannot free
him from the suspicion that he has listened at times to allusions
upon this subject. |
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of the royalty and aristocracy of England are each more suited to their
views, than that of the democracy of France. It is upon this
persuasion and project, and upon the supposed weight of character of Mr.
Washington, that the American aristocracy is now founding itself.
Tall and imposing in his person, silent and reserved in
his manners, opulent in his fortune, and attached by a high post to a
successful cause; Mr. Washington obtained character upon trust. He
found indeed no rival to his reputation in his own particular army; for he
has condemned his own army to such complete inaction, or had allowed so
little opportunity to those who commanded under him to become signalized
(unless by misfortunes occasioned chiefly by his own bad arrangements; )
that he had become the sole remarkable person in it. What was in truth
owing in his own army to the force of things, was deemed the result of
personal merit in the only apparent effective actor in it; who was thus held
great by the favour of an hypothesis. --As long however as every one was
unanimous about the politics of America, it was not worth dividing the
public opinion about a man. But as Mr. Washington has at length become
treacherous even to his own fame, what was lent to him as a harmless
general, must be withdrawn from him as a dangerous politician. --But as we
shall have further opportunities of speaking of the character of this
gentleman we shall not further detail it in this place. Suffice it to
say here that Mr. Washington may thank himself for the discussion of the
present times. Whoever forms one party, necessarily forms
two, for he forms an antagonist party and parties always end in the
scrutiny of character. He will fall therefore as a principal because
he has chosen to be a party-man.
The cloud with which the George of America has
covered himself, has been large enough to hide his own want of merit and
that of others whom he has placed in office: But when it drops, all
will be exposed together. A country which has fought above seven years
to expel a king, cannot be persuaded to receive one by surprise. The
first republic formed upon representative principles, will not restore the
system of monarchy and hereditary government in America, in favour of a
counterfeit character. It will not see Europe abrogating its
monarchies and aristocracies, one after another, and then lap up the offals
as the dog turns to his vomit. America is indolent, but not base; she
may be deceived, but cannot willingly be a deceiver; and as the weight of
property, of numbers, and |
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even of knowledge*, is on the side of the American democracy, victory
belongs to it, whenever it seems of consequence to seek it.
The government of America is something more than an
administration, without being a fixed personal property. --The President is
controlled in his power rather by the shortness of its duration, than by the
moderation of its limits; but he is fortunately responsible for his conduct.
His ministers are less of ministers than in other countries, as their lease
in office is but for four years at the utmost. --We shall not however notice
Messrs. Wolcott, Pickering and M'Henry; who are at present respectively
ministers of treasury, of state, and of war; as they have been little spoken
of in America; and as public men are wholly unknown out of it. They
rest upon Mr. Washington's pleasure for their places, and upon his (not
their own character) for the success of their projects. It is the
characters of Mr. Washington therefore which must be the great object of our
examination+.
We avow freely that our chief object here is to
destroy undue impressions in favour of Mr. Washington. --It is not
requisite therefore for us to applaud his merits; for he has already
received for these more than due praise. We seek to moderate the
excessive estimate made of them, down to the real standard of truth; and at
the same time to unveil some of his deficiencies and faults. --Mr.
Washington indeed neither as a soldier, a politician, nor a private man, has
deceived able persons, who have had the means of forming a judgment of him;
but it has happened that few of these have felt sufficient motive for
abating from his reputation. The good conceived the number of honest
men inscribed on the roll of fame too few, to wish to strike from it one who
had the semblance of being of this description; and who for a long time had
taken so fortunate a direction and had been so well rewarded, that it was
hoped that he would not abandon his course. Amiable men wished not to
disturb the satisfaction of any, from whatever cause proceeding, as long as
the public did not suffer. The indolent lastly were little disposed to
contest an opinion so pow-[erfully] *Lord
Bacon makes great account of the power arising from knowledge, as
Harrington does of that arising from property; and numbers are
of the essence of a democracy.
+Mr. Randolph addresses the following passage to Mr.
Washington. --' When I became Secretary of State * *, I soon perceived that
your popularity had been the fund, upon the credit of which all your
acts, when unpalatable in themselves, had been made current, and that this
fund was not eternal, --See his Vindication.
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[pow-]erfully supported. At present the painful moment for the man of
sensibility is arrived, when these considerations have ceased; and when an
injury of the highest from done to the public on the part of Mr. Washington,
renders it incumbent to recal the generous loan of public attachment from
one, who has been averse to pay for it even the slender interest of
neutrality. When we strip from him however the borrowed plumage
which he has so long worn with an apparent innocence; it is solely because
he has chosen to associate himself with birds of plunder and of prey; and
left the deceitful exterior which he has been permitted to assume, should
allure others within the reach of his less merciful companions.
There are those who supposed the passion for satire
universal. Yet certain it is that persons in high place, like Mr.
Washington, experience none of its mortifying effects unless by great
misconduct. They acquire applause easily and even in advance, as a
sort of tribute to their station; and trifling merits on their side cover
over multiplied defects. Like persons in a successful commerce, they
grow so rich upon small capitals, that petty drawbacks pass as nothing.
--The apparent relish for scandal where inferior characters are in view,
unless rivalship occurs, is commonly referable to a taste for wit or for
anecdote, and is rarely of the description of malevolence. Good fame
is easily conceded to good actions; actions less meritorious often avoid
notice from indifference; and where elevated conduct meets with detractors,
it is chiefly because it is misunderstood, or is borne too haughtily.
--These remarks may prevent the suspicion, that criticism is here employed
from a persuasion that it would be received by willing minds. On the
contrary, there is no wish that it should influence beyond the joint bounds
of veracity and of utility. --Having paid this chearful homage to candor and
good-will, let us return to deprive speculators of every description, of the
support derived from the present reputation of Mr. Washington. --We shall
begin with the military part of the character of this gentleman. --
No one refuses to him the claim of ordinary
sense: But sense of this class, had he more abounded in it, is not
enough for a commander in chief. --He planned a defensive war without
knowing in what a defensive war consisted. He thought (and seriously
cites authorities for it,) that it consisted in delay. It consists
however in a sure defence, accomplished with the least possible expence and
loss, in the least possible time.
B |
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Delay may or may not be essential to it, according to the case and according
to the period of the case, but what is essential is, that the defence of the
whole should not be compromised by too much attention to the parts; and that
the enemy should be deprived as soon as possible not only of his resources,
but of his very hopes. --Will Mr.Washington's military conduct abide this
criterion?
He attempted against a naval enemy, possessed of a
superior land-force, to defend Long Island and other situations, capable of
being taken in the rear by water. He consented to have depots of the
most important stores left in New-York or its vicinity; a place exposed to
attack by water; instead of having them placed in strong positions in the
country behind him; so that when deprived of many of these by the enemy, he
could no longer keep together his troops, or prevent great sickness, or
execute various military projects. The real Fabius was never despised
by Hannibal; but his imitator, Mr. Washington, was always despised by his
enemy, except when greatly favoured by situation, or enabled by the
closeness of his temper to magnify his appearance of strength. For a
long period indeed the British succeeded in every considerable expedition
purely military, which was attempted by them; so that in this defensive
war, as it was called, many months elapsed before one point actually and
seriously attacked, was really defended on the part of Mr. Washington.
As to holding the lines before Boston, Mr. Washington fond his countrymen
already posted in them; and he has not much to boast in having suffered the
enemy to continue in that city near eight months and a half, after he had
the command in that quarter. He long mistook the true place where the
communication between the middle and eastern states of America was to be
established across that important stream Hudson's River; and when
misfortunes at last pointed it out to him, he used inadequate measures to
secure this communication. He was equally slow in perceiving the
necessity of having two separate armies to act on the separate banks of
Hudson's River, when the enemy by means of its vessels was possessed of the
water between them.* Even the gradual bankruptcy of his country's
treasury, and what is more, the good effect produced by some of his own
offensive measures, did not open his eyes to the impolicy of delay. On
the contrary he suffered the war to
*See for most of these
particulars, not only the histories of the American war, but such parts of
general Washington's official correspondence, as have been published under
his own inspection; and of which we shall give specimens in an Appendix.
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linger in his hands for seven whole years, notwithstanding he had to contend
with some of the most intelligent generals in Europe.
It may be insisted here, that Mr. Washington had under
him few and bad troops, and bad generals, and that his situation was
always destitute. But were all this true, is it not the part of a
general to create every thing; resources, skill, courage, ardor, and
numbers. This was the talent of Henry IV. of France. The French
have possessed it also even in a national government during the last three
or four years, when they have had to act with militia only, with little
experience, in the midst of want and in the midst of treachery. It
would take time to run the parallel, but if we speak of commanders, the
French in the present war have displayed an host, by the side of whom
general Washington would scarcely be discoverable. He would be like a
puny shrub in the midst of a stupendous forest: he would be noticed
singly from his insignificance. Had various other American generals
commanded in his room, the British army to which he was opposed, would
probably much earlier have been repulsed or captured; the Americans would
have been more celebrated in arms; in common with other revolutionists; and
have received a peace as the result of their success, and not of the fatigue
and exhaustion of their enemy.
The small microscopic exploits of
Trenton and Princeton (which succeeded one another) were like the efforts of
despair; and the acts of a partizan rather than of a great commander in
chief. --The retreat which followed the latter was indeed in a spirited
style; but we see how impossible it is for Mr. Washington to form grand
combinations, since he speaks thus of this last expedition. 'Six or
eight hundred fresh troops upon a forced march, would have destroyed all the
British forces and magazines, taken their military chest containing seventy
thousand pounds, and put an end to the war.'* What a curious
opinion! to suppose that the loss of 70,000l. sterling, and of the
temporary supplies of stores belonging to a single corps of the British
army, would have led to an inflexible king and ministry, and a rich and
haughty nation, to any thing at that period besides greater
exertions. The event would scarcely have caused the disgrace of the
particular general under whom it happened. The British are made of
different stuff. They permit one seven years war to arise after
another; and bear to be told by their ministers, that their nation gains by
misfortune. *See general
Washington's letter of Jan. 5, 1777, as published in his collection. |
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Whoever reads the correspondence of Mr. Washington will
in truth find, that during a part of the war, his troops were commonly as
his friends have intimated, 'few and bad:' and they will equally find, that
the proximate causes of the fact were such as he describes, namely,
the employment of a fluctuating militia, instead of troops inlisted for
suitable periods; the want of arms, the want of clothing; &c. --But Mr.
Washington forgot to speak of the ulterior causes, most of which
rested principally within himself. A man of spirit and address, for
example, would have brought things to a short issue: he would have
stated the evil in a forcible manner; and then, joining all his principal
officers in the measure, he would have said that unless it was as far as
possible redressed, they must not only renounce their responsibility, but
give in their resignations. --But Mr. Washington was too timid and frigid
for such an act of zeal, and too tenacious of his post. Perhaps he was
afraid of hearing it retorted, that his own bad generalship had caused the
loss of many and varied stores, and that an army was not likely to be kept
steadily together, which was dispirited by distress, defeat, and inactivity.
A great man instead of being commanded by, is himself able to command,
circumstances; and like Hannibal, or even like general Green, he knows how
to provide resources, even when neglected by his Legislature and his nation.
It may be thought here unmanly to criticize a general
who took the field without experience. --Those who form apologies of
this description for Mr. Washington, are content to avail themselves by
turns of apology towards his censurers, and of praise towards his admirers.
The matter however should be treated differently: If he was defective
merely through want to experience, he deserves neither praise nor censure.
But we must not allow that experience is the sole or
even indispensible quality of a general, since many youthful commanders have
performed the greatest exploits. --Activity for example which does
not put too much at hazard, is as important in war as what is called
experience. By obliging the enemy to think of defence, rather than of
attack, the assailant lessens his own talk of defence, and reduces the
active force of the enemy. If the adversary has a weak point, it
becomes discovered by means of trials; and it is clear that little can be
gained in war, without something is attempted. It is a matter also
established by facts, that an active general, though often repulsed, is
always respected by his enemy, and seldom loses himself with his own troops.
No less certain also is it, that |
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Mr. Washington would not have wasted more troops in war than he saw perish
uselessly in his hospitals. --Study, of which a person in revolutionary
times meditating the acceptance of an high command, ought to have taken his
share, is another supplementary quality; but of which we see no marks in Mr.
Washington. --A native originality and vigour of mind, a turn for simple
mechanics (into which all military tactics are finally resolvable,) and a
penetration into the human heart, are also circumstances perhaps still more
essential. A commander in chief therefore should be skilled,
respecting the character of a war, as viewed according to the stage of it;
he should be able to choose decisive positions; he should shine in the arts
of subsisting and recruiting an army; in the knowledge of the character of
the adverse commander; in a talent for obtaining information; in the
invention of stratagems; in the supply of expedients for the cases (and many
are the cases) untouched by general rules; in the inspiring a soul into an
army; and in the provoking an enemy to disadvantageous action.
What are the talents however which Mr. Washington has
displayed in these respects, to name no others? Let us read his two
close octavo volumes, containing his diligent correspondence for three long
years and an half, and doubtless omitting nothing calculated (according to
his maturer judgment) for advancing his reputation. --Did he ever
anticipate that experience, of which we have been speaking; did he even
always keep pace with it; did he detect the impropriety of many professional
measures, which were imposed upon him by Congress and others; is he
inventive; does he surprise; does he instruct; does he animate us?
What still life for three years and a half! We find that the time
passes, but we scarcely perceive that he is at war and if he ever seems a
general, it is because he has to contend with those who were not such.
He relates, he argues, and sometimes he even projects; but how seldom does
he act with success.
Compare him with the great commanders in Plutarch; or
with those in other civil wars. Compare him with the youthful Conde,
who at twenty-two years of age ruined the famous corps of Spanish infantry,
in a battle fought in opposition to men proud of their sixty years of
experience, as Mr. Washington may be of 'his sixty years of virtue.'
--Compare him with the French generals of modern times, which some have
pretended to be so degenerate. Most of these generals are not only
youthful, but have been a much less time in command than Mr. Washington; yet
what genius, activity, and fire, do |
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we see, tempered with judgment; always with little exception enforcing
discipline, visiting posts, planning, preparing or acting with efficacy.
Instead of jealous suns, eclipsing each other's reputation as burning in the
same sphere, they are content to be confounded in a fraternity of glory; a
glory so uniform that one might be tempted to think that it no longer
depended upon merit, did we not see that it was gained in opposition
to a like number of generals on the other side. Those who have waited
to look for generalship in old age, have therefore lost a great deal of
time; and have neglected to remark, that military qualities either bear a
great relation to those of youth; or else demand an original turn of
thinking, which age does not always even perfect, and certainly can
seldom give. If a wise man had to assign the cause upon which
the astonishing success of the French arms has most depended (as far as it
has depended upon human causes) he would say, that next to the inspiration
of Liberty, it was upon youthful generals and youthful soldiers.
But there are yet two other accounts,
for which the example of the French armies merits to be cited. --The one is
that the activity of these armies, gives us room to hear of the merits of
their subaltern commanders. Each of these having had his
proportion of employment, each has had his proportion of praise; the
commander in chief commonly contenting himself with performing the office of
a generous secretary, to record the merits of others. --What a mortifying
blank is there in the seven years, immediate service under Mr.
Washington, and how few great men has his specific school discovered,
and especially such as are known out of America? Yet his army
naturally comprehended as many men of talent as any other, and had at least
as noble a cause for animating them. --A French replublican officer has only
to shew the station assigned to him by his commission, to make him respected
as a soldier, and to inspire a certain degree of interest. --This is a
difference of which the cause is to be ascribed solely to Mr. Washington.
A second circumstance for which we have still to cite the French armies,
regards the nature of their war. The French, like the Americans, were
provoked to war by injustice; and so far their war was defensive in
its principle; but it does not thence follow that the war of either
after its first commencement, (for we will allow of delay in its first
commencement,) ought to have remained defensive in its conduct. --The
French on their side soon wisely determined otherwise; and it is to be
remarked, that the French have seldom been beaten, but when upon the
defensive, or when |
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remaining inactive in their quarters. The moment they assumed the
offensive under a vigorous government and faithful officers,
(notwithstanding many of these latter had seen no service except during the
war in which they were fighting, or else only as subalterns) what a torrent
of action, what a succession of triumphs, here and there suspended for a
moment only, by causes which are yet to be explained! It was no longer
needful to look into history for examples; each general and each army
furnished them to the others; and burning only for an occasion to settle
their proud arrears with fame and their country, their adversaries at last
were commonly accustomed to expect their attack as men already conquered.
--It has resulted from this that there is no power in Europe which thinks it
inglorious to have been beaten by the French; all deriving this
species of consolation from the merit of their enemy, and from their own
community in misfortune. --After perusing the languid letters of Mr.
Washington for three years and an half, filled with vain regrets of evils
and disasters which he could neither prevent nor remedy, and could rarely
even foresee, what a contrast is offered by the concise relation given by
the citizen Carnot of the victories of the French in their celebrated long
campaign*; victories, which he had so much share in organizing, and which
sprang out of a war upon defensive principles.
To return then to the American war, let us observe that
it was not ended by general Washington; but by generals Gates, Green, and
Rochambeau; by the coalition of various European powers against England; by
the American privateers; by the fall of the British funds; by the increase
of the British taxes; by the obstinacy of the Congress and people of
America; by the discontent of the people of England; by the loan or gift of
money and stores to America by France; and by the aid of French engineers+.
Let us here, for the present, quit the military career of Mr.
Washington.
IF we ask afer the political measures of general
Washington, where shall we seek them? --Are they to be seen in his
encouragement of the order of Cincinnati, so much against prin-[ciple]
*See published by authority a
chronological account of part of this campaign, beginning from 8th September
1793, and terminating 29th January 1795. Reckoning affairs of posts,
general actions, and attacks and conquests of fortresses and provinces; this
portion of the campaign contains at the rate of about three or four
events of moment in every week during its coninuance.
+ To the want of these engineers,
the early disasters of the American war are principally to be ascribed; for
among all the characters in the military profession, that of an engineer
comprehends the qualities most analogous to those of a commander in chief.
As a proof of the general fact, we find Forts Washington and Lee ill placed,
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[prin-]ciple and consistency; in his stately journeyings through the
American continent in search of personal incense; in his ostentatious
profession of piety, suited to attach a party in the middle and eastern
States; in funding at an high interest a depreciated public debt, which had
passed into third hands, (without making due search after those who had
suffered by its fall); in his consenting in a manner to render this debt
perpetual, as a tie in behalf of those in power; in favouring jobbers in
lands; in countenancing factions; in putting the militia into pompous
movement, to crush a petty insurrection against an excise-tax, (odious both
by nature and name to all of English origin;) in his submission on the other
hand to English intrigues, designed to involve the United States in various
cruel wars; in his pusillanimous neglect of proper measures for enforcing
the execution of the treaty of peace with England, made in 1782-3; in his
slow removal of the obstacles given by the Spaniards on the Mississippi; in
an acquiescence (so mischievous to both countries) in the system of maritime
oppression of the British ministry; in the neglect of the overtures made by
foreign countries for combining against this practice during war; in
permitting the British to impress American sailors; and lastly, in
fabricating a treaty destined to have military and diplomatic
effects, under the name of a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation; by
which he disgraced the American character in politics, which he had failed
to illustrate in war, and made national interests subservient to his little
passions. To learn the dimensions of this gentleman's mind, as also
his idea of "solemn conjunct" wisdom with his counsellors, and
likewise his want of frankness and generosity in his personal commerce with
his friends; it is proper to read Mr. Randolph's narrative upon the subject
of the above treaty with Great Britain; a treaty, calculated to embroil
America at home and abroad, without its gaining one true friend, or one
honourable and permanent advantage.
BUT the want of wisdom in the treaty of
commerce with Great Britain, is but the smallest part of Mr.
Washington's reproach upon this subject. There is besides, a want of
morality in it, which indicates either his personal views, or else
his hostility to the principles of the French government, and
consequently to those of America. --Let us place some of the
and therefore necessarily ill defended; while the forts on
the Delaware were placed with science and well constructed, and therefore
well defended. --For the share of the French in the latter case, see general
Washington's letters dated 13th September, 1777, and 13th January, 1778 (to
cite no others.) |
 |
| 13 |
British and American measures in contrast with others of the French, as they
stood previous to his ratification of the treaty; that this dilemma may be
made fully apparent. The warm opponents of Mr. Washington may think
him caught upon both horns of this dilemma, but we shall leave
himself to choose between them. |
 |
|
|
British or American Measures.
_______
A war by England against American liberty, was
cruelly begun, barely conducted, and abandoned only from necessity.
Indifference or insult was exhibited on the part
of England towards America, from the peace in 1783 till the treaty in 1794;
unless where fear or interest produced concession.
Mr. Gouverneur Morris, an avowed enemy of the French
revolution, and a supposed adviser of the French court, was nevertheless
continued as the American minister at Paris, and the known confidant of Mr.
Washington.
Mr. G. Morris was recalled in consequence of the recall
of Mr. Genet; but with many compliments on the part of general Washington,
who still corresponds with him confidentially.
The English force Holland and Tuscany into the
coalition against France, contrary to their wishes; and attempt the like
violence with Switzerland, Genoa, and other States.
The English government gradually tramples under foot |
French Measures.
_______
Aid was given by France in this war
against the British, from motives of intrigue in the French court; but it
was concurred in from motives of attachment in the French nation.
A liberal policy was generally manifested by the French
court before the revolution; and the warmest affection was shewn by the
French nation afterwards.
Mr. Genet, the French minister in America, during the
prevalence of an irregular diplomatic system in France, offends general
Washington by appealing against him to the American people, on the basis of
the rights of man.
Mr. Genet is recalled at Mr. Washington's desire; and
not known to be noticed afterwards by his government.
The French lose a part of their
possessions in the West Indies; and avoid claiming the assistance of the
United States for resuming them, as was authorized by treaty.
The French gradually resume principles of moderation |
| 14 |
|
the British and Irish liberties; using expedients for this purpose similar
to those of which the Americans had complained in their own contest with it.
The American flag was universally violated by the
British. The English excite the American savages
against the United States; and are suspected of other machinations with this
view among the Barbary powers and elsewhere equally reprehensible*.
The English constantly refuse to execute important
parts of the treaty of 1782-3.
Mr. Jay being sent to England under false
pretences, concludes there a treaty of the most extensive and peculiar
nature; and keeps the contents of it secret; untrue information concerning
it being officially conveyed to the French. |
in their interior government, from which they never would have departed, but
for the power of a faction since suppressed.
If the violations of the American flag by the French
are held equivalent to those of the British, they were at least
subsequent to and caused by them.
This is not only without parallel on the part of
France; but the French felt an interest in accommodating the dispute of
America with the Barbary powers.
The French are charged with nothing similar;
captures (at sea) as above mentioned excepted.
The French being attached not only to America, but to
Mr. Washington, patiently attend the issue. |
 |
*It is well known, for example, that
the English without the authority of Portugal, concluded a truce of six
months, between that country and Algiers, in order that the Algerines might
go out of port to cruise against the Americans trading with France. --The
English had only the power to conclude a peace, and not a truce. The
Portuguese ministry, it is said, make little account even of a peace with
Algiers; a part of their marine being held in exercise by confining the
Algerines to their ports.
In Mr. Randolph's official letter to Mr. Jay, during
the latter's residence in England (which letter was approved by Mr.
Washington) we find him saying: 'We cannot add upon proof, that the
British influence has been tampering with the people of Kentucky and of
the neighborhood of Pittsburgh, to seduce them from the United States,
or to encourage them in a revolt against the general government. --It has
however been boasted of by them: and an expectation of such
support is suspected to have been excited in the breasts of some.' --See
his Vindication; in the parts where he comments upon the paragraphs 15 & 16
of Mr. Fauchet's letter. --He gives various reasons for presuming the fact;
among which however he has omitted the correspondence of conduct in the
British ministry towards America and France during their respective
revolutionary wars. The events in Virginia and other of the United
colonies, and afterwards at Toulon and La Vendee, are unequivocal on this
subject; since they were openly avowed by official proclamations.
|
| 15 |
|
The treaty is make publicly known in America, above
seven months after its signature* and with the exception of certain
stipulations displeasing to the American merchants, was ratified by the
Senate and President.
Mr. Hammond, the English minister in America, is
universally suspected by impartial men of having used bribery; (known
to be the great instrument of the British government at home and abroad.)
Captures at sea are continued to be made by the British government
after the signature (and N. B. even after the ratification) of the
commercial treaty with America.
American sailors are every where impressed by
the British; who sometimes attacked vessels by force of arms in order to
seize their sailors, even when under the protection of the British flag+.
It remains to be seen whether the Americans will meet
with payment for all their losses |
The French long persist in the same sentiments and
conduct.
Mr. Fauchet, the French minister in America, was
accused of using bribery, when apparently without the means of bribing; from
the poverty of his government, and perhaps from their then adopted
principles.
The French were during an interval little reproached on
this head, till the American government suffered the new treaty with Great
Britain to be violated. (The French then determined to imitate the
British conduct, as the only means of bringing the American government to
its senses and procuring justice.)
Even in the time of terror in France, the persons of
Americans were never violated as such; and their seamen were in no instance
impressed.
If the French have not fulfilled their debts of
this kind, the Americans have at least |
 |
*It was signed 19th November 1794;
arrived in America 7th March 1795; was kept secret by the Senate near three
months; was then voted as matter of secrecy by the Senate, and was only made
public on or after June 29, 1795. --Its ratification by the Senate was on
June 24, and by the President on August 18, 1795.
+ As in St. Domingo, in a port which had submitted to
the British, and after the treaty of commerce was known to have been
signed. The American sailors possessed of more spirit than Mr.
Washington, courageously and successfully retailed the attack though not
without some loss in killed and wounded on both sides. |
| 16 |
|
by British cruisers, recognised by the British themselves. |
the satisfaction of knowing that it has been from a complete inability; the
mortification of the delay being in general neither by prevarication nor by
insult. |
 |
From this construct, it will be seen how much the
Americans have owed to France and how little to England; and what wrongs the
American government has overlooked from England, in order to purchase its
slippery friendship; a friendship, which a British ministry like the
present, (should it last,) will probably withdraw after the war ends, which
led them to profess it. In England, they love the deeds of Mr.
Washington, but cannot love the actor, even if they should find it
convenient to flatter him. In France it would be happy if they only
despised both. --It is true, that the treaty with the British exhibits in
some respects more of mischief meditated, than perpetuated; since one part
of the treaty which was hostile to France is left unratified.
The twenty-fifth article also of this treaty formally confirms the preceding
treaties with France of every kind; (by declaring that nothing in the
British treaty 'shall be construed or [shall] operate contrary to 'former
and existing public treaties with other sovereigns and states.') --But
this has nothing to do with Mr. Washington. His fault is
complete, the treaty being framed by his agent, furnished with his
instructions both avowed and secret; and having been approved by him (with
little known exception of moment respecting France, unless in the
case of a part of the twelfth article,) as conformable to their tenor and
motives. The stipulations which he was obliged to see cancelled, are
by no means the whole of those which shew hostility to France, servility to
England, and a betrayal of America. There are others which manifest an
equal abandonment of the rights of men, of nations, and of Americans (and
which as has been mentioned, can only be accounted for upon the supposition
of personal views in Mr. Washington, or a defect in his public principles.)
--To explain these incidents upon the footing of Mr. Washington's
ignorance of their tendency, is to attribute to that gentleman a greater
defect of intellect, than can be admitted either by his friends or his
adversaries.
This treaty with England is altogether a rich field for
the critic; but we examine not all its parts. It has already received
that species of moral, political, and literary discussion, which no act of
this nature in a free and reasoning age can long |
| 17 |
survive. The free trader must detest it in practice; the politician
and philanthropist must abhor it in principle; and the student, who
traces the slow but useful progress of the natural code from barbarian to
justice, must be astonished at its conception and outraged by its
ratification. Whatever ground human nature had been gaining against
self-legalized free-booters for a century past, is abandoned by it in an
instant.
NOTWITHSTANDING we omit to discuss many parts of
the commercial treaty between England and America; yet, to prepare us for
noticing some of the passages which regard neutral commerce during war
(the grand pretext for the treaty,) we shall say a word of general
principles. When two individuals quarrel and disturb their neighbours,
these neighbours (or the public government in their stead) reduce the
litigants to peace. So when two governments quarrel, other governments
and nations must not be thrown into commotion on account of the madness of
tow, and still less of the madness of one. Quarrelsome governments
however affirm, that if the means of supplies are left open to an enemy, by
a free commerce; or if foreign allies can throw in aid by means of a free
navigation, it may be difficult to annoy an enemy. The friends of
peace think this a reason on the opposite side, since if governments cease
to have the power of annoying each other wars themslves must cease.
--The laws of nations then have ended in the following compromise:
namely, that neutral property shall not be stopped at sea, if not directly
aiding to the war; (and that provisions especially, shall be free
from capture;) but that articles directly useful for military
enterprizes, whether by land or sea, and going to an enemy, and all articles
whatever going to a place besieged or blockaded, shall be held for the time
as contraband*. A wide field remaining as to the number of
these articles; as to the limits within which they may be stopped; as to the
respective means of protection and examintions, &c. &c. it is usual when
commercial treaties are negociated, to propose new stipulations on these
subjects. --But this is only one branch of the grand dispute; namely that
regarding goods. There is an article behind regarding ships.
Belligerent powers having assumed a right to seize, at
sea, the property of the subjects of those with whom they are at war,
certain of these powers contend that they may seize it
*The word contraband in
commercial treaties scarcely ever refers to what is called smuggling,
or acts contrary to domestic laws; but to contraband in war, and
relates to foreign nations. |
 |
| 18 |
even in neutral vessels. Men of humanity argue, that wars (a few cases
excepted) ought to confine their effects to the governments and the military
forces which these employ; and that it is a twofold violation of social
order, to seize the property of private persons* under neutral
sanction. --The laws of nations (which notwithstanding this pompous title,
are only the fluctuating rules, or rather practice, of the
majority of European nations,) have in this second instance however been
less uniform that in the first. Certain powers interested in the
employment of merchant-ships, or else for particular reasons indisposed to
war, or if often engaged in war, yet weaker by sea than the enemy,
habitually opposed to them, have desired, subject to certain regulations and
exceptions, that neutral vessels should not only cover hostile property, but
even persons, (provided these were not soldiers.) Other powers have,
for counter reasons and at particular times, violently opposed these
pretensions; so that matters were greatly regulated by the circumstances of
the moment. --Nevertheless the doctrine, that free bottoms ought in general
to give passport to whatever was embarked upon them, was likely soon to have
become universal. The celebrated armed neutrality had made
this, during the American war, at once the rule and the practice for the
greater majority of European nations; and the increasing instruction of the
times, with the haughty manner in which the English exercised their naval
supremacy, would naturally have caused the engagement to be soon permanently
renewed, after the coalition against France had ended. --Even England
herself, in the few instances where she was a tranquil spectator of the
wars of others, had no objection to profit by the neutral carrying trade
to its full extent, even admitting that free ships made free goods.
Its ministry acceded to these principles, in the instance of the treaty of
commerce with France, signed at Utrecht in 1713+; and again in nearly the
same words in that with the same nation signed at Versailles in 1786; (the
latter being ratified by the British parliament.)
*Dr. Franklin concluded for the United States of
America a treaty with Frederic II. king of Prussia; which forbids the
capture of the property of individuals at sea. The improbability of a
contest between America and Prussia does not diminish the authority of the
opinions of these personages on the subject in question; which was viewed by
each in a manner thus confessed to be disinterested. The king of
Prussia indeed knew that the thing was to a certain degree recognized in
land-wars, and might perceive that it could with more facility and upon
clearer principles be admitted at sea. -----N.B. France offered to allow
this immunity to all maritime trade in the present war, but the English
rejected the proposition as ridiculous.
+ See for example Art.
20, 21, 22 and 23. |
 |
| 19 |
SUCH was the state of things, when Mr. Jay was sent
to remonstrate against the capture of American vessels, contrary even to the
most limited rules ever affected to be held for the neutral nations; for the
British not only called at fancy the whole French empire and its conquests
blockaded, (in opposition to the definitions in neutral codes of the
term blockaded;) but they seized, and their colonial admiralty courts
in particular, condemned, whatever was found in certain seas belonging to
America. Mr. Jay was sent by Mr. Washington to England as if to
complain of this; and Mr. Jay ended in concluding a treaty, afterwards
ratified by Mr. Washington, which (in one shape or other) nearly sanctioned
for the future all of which he was sent to complain. This was the more
strange and ignominious, as America had joyfully acceded not only from
momentary motives, but from lasting principles, to the armed neutrality; to
the existence of which, it is to be observed, her war with England had given
occasion; and which nevertheless, herself and Russia (no very reputable
colleague in a case of justice,) have been the first and only
powers to abandon.
Not content however with the mischief which
it has already done, the treaty of Mr. Jay lusts after more. Even in
the cool attitude of theory, it thus stipulates, in that part of the twelfth
article which still subsists: 'The said parties will then [that is,
two years after the present belligerent powers shall have concluded upon a
peace,] renew their discussions, and ENDEAVOUR to agree whether in any
and what cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property;
and in what cases PROVISIONS and other articles, not generally
contraband, may become such.' --The American treaty-makers by this
phraseology appear to have considered themselves as capable of dictating a
general neutral code. --Why did they not then guide it in favour of
humanity? The answer is, that they thought of particular projects,
more than of the general good. Happily however human destinies in this
respect are not at their command; and the times are arrived when principles
will get the better of factions, instead of factions of principles.
But let us speak more minutely of the trade in
provisions, which is alluded to in this passage. --The commercial treaty
of America with France in 1778, excepts from the class of contraband
with the following articles: 'Wheat and barley, and any other kind of
corn and pulse; tobacco and likewise all manner of spices; salted and
smoaked flesh, salted fish, cheese and butter, beer, oil, wines, sugar and
all sorts of salts; and in general all provisions which serve for the
nourishment of mankind |
 |
| 20 |
and the sustenance of life.' The classification of these
articles is neither complete nor scientific, but the affecting words at the
close compensate for such defects. These words are hte more to be
remarked, as they are in substance common to almost all modern commercial
treaties; and particularly to those signed between England and France, in
1713 and 1786. --It cannot therefore have been through ignorance (to which
in other cases in this inquiry no small latitude shall be allowed to be
due,) that this salutary and benevolent policy was rejected. The
British party in America erred against their better knowledge: they
rushed counter to the whole stream of American diplomatics from the
first hour of the birth of the American republican government. --They
abandoned justice, dignity, philanthropy, and national policy, that all
concerned might favour their passion for aristocracy. The merchants of
the party likewise were anxious after commercial credits from the British
merchants, and after certain privileges in the gift of the British
government; the land-jobbers and other monopolists were gratified with the
general congeniality of their system to that of Great Britain; the
American administration detested French politics; and the
President was jealous of French individuals. Mr. Genet and
Mr. Fauchet had wounded the self-love of this cold philosopher. From
that moment the rights of man, the nourishment of mankind, and the
sustenance of life seemed as nothing. In the eye of Providence all men
are equals; in the eye of self-love one man is equal to all.
THIS pledge for a future discussion respecting
the efficacy of the neutral flag and respecting the seizure of provisions
and other articles not generally [reputed] contraband, forms the remnant of
the twelfth article of the commercial treaty with Great Britain.
Having been actually ratified by Mr. Washington and the Senate, it is
fit that we should consider upon a large scale for whom and
against whom the principle of it is to operate. --It is to
operate in favor of so much (and it is commonly the worst part) of the
British empire, as shall incline at any time to war. At present
(reckoning Ireland and the discontented party in England and Scotland) its
principle cannot gratify the half of this empire; and in another war, the
views of the British ministry may be still more unpopular. In any
event it authorizes one single nation, when in the humour to murder its
neighbours, to bend before it the maritime commerce of the whole globe
during the intire period of the contest, (that is, as every one knows, for |
 |
| 21 |
an average of seven years out of every twenty-one.) It says, every
where, 'Stop naval traveller, whatever be your nation; for you move only by
my permission. --My ambition stands for law upon the most distant seas; and
as long as I remain in war, you are all doomed to a state of deprivation and
of sufferance. You, perhaps, know nothing of my quarrel, or you think
me in the wrong, but what is that to you or to me. Not a letter
whether relating to trade, domestic life, or science, shall pass without
having its secret violated and perhaps its ultimate destination frustrated.
--I derange the order of your voyages, and thus deprive you of the full
advantage and profit of your vessels; I prevent your access to
certain markets, and the access of certain customers to your markets and
thus deprive you not only of an extent for your sales, but reduce you
to suffer in your purchases; all which are losses not included in
the sentences of indemnification. I confiscate at pleasure, even
what is destined for the nourishment of mankind. If I pay you,
it shall be after a decision in my own courts, by my own laws, upon my own
estimates and at my own time. --Do you ask why the intercourse of the human
race by sea is thus controlled; and why even females, infancy and age are
robbed in many cases of their only means for providing the sustenance of
life? It is, some may answer, because an English George chooses to
rival the German Theodore, as king of Corsica; because he desires to have a
few more islands in the West Indies, where slavery may shed its blood under
the lash, or drop it by the no less cruel sweat of labor; because he has not
yet millions enough of Hindoos in the East to be famished by his
extortioners; because he requires another war perhaps in which to redress
his laurels tarnished in the present against the rights of man; or because
the impress of his sailors would never be permitted, were they not consoled
by the hope of the general plunder of the seas. Whatever exaggerations
there may be in this account, it is to be lamented that any color has been
given to employ it.'
The twelfth article, even in its retrenched state and
after the loss of so much peccant matter as has been taken from it, yet by a
wanton anticipation recognizes a possible right in certain persons to rob
all, whenever (as has been said) they find it convenient to rob and
murder a few. It communicates the curse of the turbulent to
every peaceful nation on the globe, and allows war to be generalized
whenever it once commences. It intimates that a whole empire may be
called blockaded, at pleasure; even when its immense coasts in Europe border
upon three large or open seas, besides communicating with |
 |
| 22 |
various foreign countries by land; and besides having an equal number of
accessible points in the East and West Indies. It allows the English
to say not only that their enemies shall not trade with neutral
parties, but that neutral parties shall not for their own benefit be allowed
to trade with them. It allows them to arrest, scrutinize, and
if they please, to carry into port, every cargo which they find upon the
seas, if a part of it only chances to belong to an enemy; or if the
stoppage of the cargo shall, in their opinion, either injure the enemy or
benefit themselves.
It thus justifies the tyrannic boast of the English
sailor, that it is his practice to do no right and take* no wrong;
and goes contrary to the natural presumption, that when two parties are in
dispute, the strongest is probably the aggressor. --Having thus seen for
whom the treaty is to act, let us see against whom it is both
designed to act, or really acts.
It is clear that the treaty of Mr. Jay is not formed,
upon the plan of a friendship with both of the rival nations of
England and France; nor yet upon that of indifference to both.
It is formed upon the basis of friendship to one and of defiance to
the other. Gratitude and humanity, and perhaps many may think
policy would have given the palm to France; but intrigue and aristocracy
gave the preference to England. --Though we do not expect sublime genius
from Mr. Washington, yet as he cannot but have seen wherein lay the
spirit and essence of the present treaty, it is this
consciousness which condemns him. He should have done nothing, rather
than have done wrong. The treaty then was designed to operate against
France; a nation in the act of imitating the example of America, and checked
in the attempt by England, the old enemy of the liberty of America, which
had itself triumphed over England by the aid of France. --We might here stop
to conjecture what would have been the state of human liberty (civil and
religious,) had the coalition conquered; what it will not be when France has
conquered; and where American would have stood had it been left naked and
friendless to the revenge of England? But discerning and feeling men
have long decided these subjects; and America for the sake of itself and of
humanity at large, ought at least to have dealt with even hands, and to have
objected to the extinction of the independence or even power of France.
--The madness of the terrorist faction in France, however capricious and
desperate, was not of a nature to turn aside a
* That is, submit to. |
 |
| 23 |
man of firm mind and grand principle. Had Robespierre been a little
more successful, he would soon have been received into the class of
independent sovereigns, which in many instances exhibited no better company
than his own. --In any event Mr. Washington was little
authorised to despair; having himself declared, after the American
peace, that it was yet to be seen whether the American revolution was to
be called a blessing; and yet nevertheless in the last winter having
found his country in so flattering a point of view, that he publicly
insulted France with the comparison. --This insult was suspected, and
perhaps not without reason, as Mr. Washington's fashion of acceding to the
coalition; and had it not been for the extreme credit and good judgment of
those who represented the American nation in France, and for the prudent
temper of the French Executive Directory; serious resentment might have
followed, to the no small satisfaction perhaps of some in America. --But
quitting this reprehensible sally on the part of Mr. Washington, let us ask
why France was to be supposed less capable of recovering from a state of
disease than America? Was it because it had not general Washington for
its physician? Where too was the evil of waiting; since if France had
been subjugated, a commercial treaty would not have prevented England from
attempting to resume its ancient sovereignty over America. The treaty
has evidently gained by submission and by trick nothing that might not have
been gained either by spirit or by good character. --And it is clear,
that if matters are still short of a state of actual hostility with France,
it must be owing to a magnanimity in France which triples the degradation of
America. --France then was the party against whom the system in
question was more immediately designed to operate.
But the framers of the commercial treaty with
England had at the same time a talent in producing evil, which indirectly
recoils upon America itself. --They have spun a web upon which sophistry
cannot even itself travel with safety. --America constitutes one vast farm,
exporting provision, cattle, and timber, and whatever stands connected with
these; a part of her coasts form one vast scene of fishery; she is a great
voyager upon the ocean; she wishes to live in peace, without any expence
arising from military establishments; and nothing can second these views but
the success of neutral principles. --'Yes Americans, you count
your acres of land, your merchant-ships, your imports and your exports with
exultation; and yet the projects of your treaty-makers annul the effect of
the whole. You forget that your case requires an |
 |
| 24 |
option. You must either determine to build and maintain a navy,
with all its burthens and evils; or else you must support neutral principles
which shall control the navies of other nations. You have no other
alternative; unless you mean to renounce maritime commerce altogether or
unless you design to become subservient to one of the maritime powers, and
to take the chance not only of its generosity towards you, but of its being
always in a condition to protect you. There is no middle
course. --Your treaty-makers indeed have thought differently, because they
feel differently. They seem to mean themselves or their systems
rather than you or your systems; and give up your dearest interests
in advance, as if resolved to obtain no public return for their
concessions.' THE full discussion
respecting the protection (if any) to be given by neutral vessels to
enemy's property, and respecting provisions and contraband articles, we have
hitherto supposed a matter in embrio. --But what must be our
indignation, when we find that the treaty has already decided this in a
clandestine manner, for an indefinite time; but so as expressly to
have effect during the present war, and two years beyond it.
With a slight reserve every thing is made contraband for which England
chooses to pay. The pretended solemn delay of the discussion was
therefore apparently only calculated to lay asleep doubt, and enable the
treaty-makers the more securely to steal a march upon an unsuspecting
public. --The middle paragraph of the eighteenth article runs (in
substance) thus; 'Whereas the difficulty of deciding when provisions
and other articles not generally held contraband may yet be regarded
as such, may produce contests; it is agreed, that articles seized as
contraband, pursuant to the existing laws of nations, shall not
be confiscated, but be paid for*'. --The
* The original words of the
treaty are these. 'And whereas the DIFFICULTY of agreeing on the
precise cases in which alone provisions and other articles not generally
contraband, may be regarded as such; renders it expedient to provide against
the inconveniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise. It
is further agreed, that whenever any such articles so becoming contraband
according to the EXISTING laws of nations, shall for THAT REASON be seized,
the same shall 'not be confiscated; but the owners thereof shall be
speedily and completely indemnified; --and the captors (or in their
default the government under whose authority they act) shall pay to the
masters and owners of such vessels the full value of all articles, with a
reasonable mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight and also the
demurrage incident to such detention.'
N. B. We have already (in the last paragraph but
three) shewn that there are other losses of which the indemnity is not here
included; some of them indeed being incurred by persons whose cause is
not before the court empowered to decide.
The last clause of this eighteenth article does
not permit vessels in the case of a town besieged, blockaded, or invested,
or be confiscated, even though paid for; un-[less] |
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| 25 |
English when they desire to produce a famine in France, ask for nothing but
permission to seize its food upon paying for it; and this is what is
intended to be established in the present article. --But the subtilty of the
clause lies only in its obscurity. The first member of the clause
declares, that the subject of of it regards provisions and articles not
generally or certainly contraband; and the second member says, that it
regards articles actually and clearly contraband according to the
existing laws of nations. Who would have supposed, (to use the logical
language of the schools,) that in the short distance between the predicate
and the thing predicated, between the subject and the thing affirmed of the
subject; that a prevarication like this would have been attempted?
Yet, such is this confusion of terms, by which it is designed to deceive
America and France on the one hand, and to give the English on the other a
fort of half title (to be improved by possession into a whole
title) to seize even articles not generally deemed contraband, upon a
pretended indemnification. It was presumed that neither Americans nor
French would fathom the depth of this; that England might seize, and that
America and France would suffer, without perceiving the cause; or else that
America by a due mixture of force on one side, and of pretended indemnity on
the other, would be induced to become consenting to the crime. --This is the
real tendency of the passage before us; for as to the stipulations
respecting the payment of the things seized (even if it were an ample
payment,) it amounts to nothing. What is liable to seizure is
not saved by it; and what is not liable to seizure ought not to be
stopped at all. --Thus therefore (by a shuffle too poor to deserve the name
of art) the property of the individual and the honour of the
government of America are prostituted, in a manner of which the contrivers
themselves are ashamed; since they use subterfuge to conceal it. The
trick though dark, is not the less certain; and it is declared to be binding
in the very article of the treaty which says that the discussion of the
matter is deferred*. --If Mr. Wash-[ington]
[un-]less persisting in an attempt to enter, after warning
given. The same holds for goods. This is the flight reserve
referred to above. It serves still more certainly to remove our doubts
as to the spirit of the principal clause just recited; especially as it
equally tends to the great object of famine, with seizure and
indemnification.
* Till it is determined, by the
discussion which is to take place two years after the present war
shall have ceased, 'whether in any and what cases neutral vessels shall
protect enemy's property, and in what cases provisions and other articles
not generally contraband may become such;' --the twelfth article (of
which this citation forms a part) immediately adds as follows; 'the conduct
of the parties in the mean time towards each other in these respects,
shall be regulated by the articles herein-after inserted on these subjects.' |
 |
| 26 |
[Wash-]ington did not penetrate into this, or did not see that the treaty
was defective in its wording in a most important passage; he ranks lower in
understanding than from candour we have been willing to suppose.
BEFORE we terminate the subject of the treaty of commerce with England, it
is difficult to avoid noticing another detached part of it, as indicative of
its temper. --It is a practice and frequently is thought a favour, for
individuals to enter into the military service of foreign nations both by
land and by sea. It is commonly encouraged by the states to which
these strangers belong, if these states have few wars of their own; in order
that the art of war may be learned at the expence of others, to be ready to
use for home defence. America was precisely in the case to have
benefited from this practice, on account of her small military establishment
and her absolute want of navy. --By article twenty-two however of Mr. Jay's
treaty, the privilege of resorting to this school is forbidden. But
the motive for this prohibition is by no means one which has relation either
to philosophy or humanity. --The Americans were thought skilful in
privateering, and not indisposed to be concerned in these cases on the side
of the French, where their aid was also more wanted than on the side of the
English; and, to injure France therefore this practice was prohibited, that
is, if used on the side of France. --To shew that this construction
is not uncandid, we remark that no equivalent measure has since been taken
in America, to prevent Americans serving with the British against France;
and yet both prudence and the friendship due to an ally, required this
reciprocity of conduct which would have been the more kindly received by the
French as being spontaneous. --We remark further, that not one word
is said in the treaty respecting the execrable mode of impressing
American seamen to fight against the French, which is used by the
British; and which is paralleled by no other nation upon earth; and which
no other nation upon earth submits to but the American. This
crying evil, so detested in America, so ruinous to trade, so shocking to
humanity, and which is in every view so much more exceptionable than
voluntary service, is passed over in silence by the treaty, which is in so
many respects a treaty against France. --Yet, in what does the service by
force among the British, differ in theory, from a service by force among the
Algerines, except in being more temporary; for in neither service is the
conscience of the party at all consulted; war being waged with all
alike at the command of another? This provision in the |
 |
| 27 |
treaty is additionally reprehensible, since it is futile and excites
resentment for nothing; for though the treaty (in order to save trouble to
the American government) abandons the American citizens to the penalties
annexed to piracy, yet France will always protect those serving her by
retaliating every injury shewn to them by the English.
We may here observe by way of parenthesis, how ripe the
American aristocracy has become by time, by power, and by wealth. --The
impressing of American seamen to fight in a cause they did not
approve, was by Mr. Washington and his coadjutors highly reprobated in 1776,
in the conduct of Great Britain, but in 1794, the case changes its color.
These seamen were now to be impressed to fight against France, in favour of
the general cause of monarchy and of aristocracy; a cause, in which these
gentlemen in some degree partook, and too probably hoped still more to
partake. The impressing of seamen was from this moment no longer a
crime worthy of mention. --Such are the tempers of aristocrates and
monocrates*; of those who favour the pre-eminence of a few or the
prerogative of one. --Listen ye democrates, who are the lovers of the
many, and if possible of the whole. --Suppose a cousin of Mr.
Washington, a brother of Mr. Jay, or a son of their partisans in the Senate,
to have been impressed by the British; do you think that memorials
upon memorials to the British ministry, on the part of the American
government, would have been wanting; that a coffee-house in any principal
American city would have been left unagitated; that any American
drawing-room, in which feathers and perfumes prevail, would have been
silent? Let Britain however only abstain from injuring the sacred clan
of rich and polished Americans, let her wage a cruel war against the
national independence elsewhere than in America; and she will find no
complaint assailing her repose. American citizens of all descriptions
shall then be restrained from fighting even voluntarily on the
side of liberty; and American citizens of an inferior description shall them
with impunity be impressed to fight against their wills on the side
of slavery. Yes, not the smallest sufferings of aristocracy
shall be disregarded; but for you who are not of the favored tribe, die
abroad by the bullets or in the prisons of savages, or die at home in your
woods, for as you have lived so shall you die without attention, till you
begin at last to remember yourselves.
* Monocrates are those who favour the placing power in
the hands of one. |
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| 28 |
This treaty of commerce then is uni-partite* in a
new sense; for it rejects distinctions of nations, in order to take care of
one artificial class of men. In many of hte cases in which it
pretends to consult the interest of America, it balances dubious advantages
by decisive immorality; and though it sacrifices honor, it is without
obtaining safety. To the true and eternal policy of America it runs
absolutely counter. It militates for example against the respect due
to the neutral flag, and against the progress of pacific principles;
it mixes America in the politics of Europe, in exact proportion as it
narrows its commerce with it; and it throws away the shield which a
character for worth and honor might give to an unarmed nation. --The
engagements to France which are substantially, if not literally violated by
this treaty, bear the more heavy upon the good fame of America; as
they were engagements to which interest and gratitude had each put their
seal, and which the generosity of France had made easy to be observed.
THE mention of the antient engagements to France, leads us to notice a
pretext for the commercial treaty with England, which if countenanced
(as some have conjectured) by Mr. Washington; would render him
supereminently guilty. When he sent (and by his sending be it observed
that he gave his initiative+ to the treaty,) when he sent to England
to negotiate it, the French were for the moment dispossessed of most of
their West Indian colonies; of which America had given the perpetual
guarantee. It has been insinuated then that it was to enable Mr.
Washington on the part of America, to set at defiance a possible
application from France upon the subject of the West Indies, that he
provided a protector in England. --If this were his device, it would
only shew how difficult it is to do wrong by halves. To decline
fulfilling the stipulations of that important treaty, by which America was
enabled so easily to obtain her independence, would have been a sufficient
disappointment to France; without adding the further inquiry of virtually
becoming her enemy, because it was difficult to be her friend.
Hitherto also France had withheld from an appeal to the guarantee, partly
from thinking the neutrality of America more useful than her alliance, and
thus rendered the politics here attributed to Mr. Washington the more
disgraceful, as being superfluous. Let the conduct of
*Deeds to which there are three
or four parties, are respectively called tripartite or
quadripartite, and so on. A treaty is commonly called uni-partite,
when the interest of one of the parties is made predominant.
+ To have the initiative in a concern, is to
have the first or beginning step. |
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| 29 |
Mr. Washington and of France however be explained in this or in any other
mode satisfactory to the makers of the present treaty; the proceedings of
the French under what is pretended to have been the worst of
administrations, have still intrinsically exceeded those of America under
what is pretended to have been the best of administrations*. --But quitting
for the present the treaty, let us prove more fully than we have yet done
our title to examine the character of Mr. Washington.
WHOEVER consents to be a public man, from
that moment abandons himself to the public scrutiny. Seated in public
employ, the people have a right to decide whether his qualifications are
commensurate or not to what he has undertaken. He would no longer be
the servant of the state, but its master, if he could prevent a discussion,
by which the praiseworthy cannot suffer, but only the defective and the
criminal. --This right then of discussing public characters we have applied
to Mr. Washington, not wantonly but from public motives. --After all, we are
accusers only; leaving the public to judge; which judges alike the accused
and the accuser. If the accused is charged falsely, or with
exaggeration, or even without a due object in view; the weight of the public
odium will hang heaviest on the accuser.
It has appeared useful to scrutinize the
character of Mr. Washington, since many employ it as a pretext for not
examining his actions. 'His abilities make him discern better
than others, his patriotism insures his attention to the public good, his
services render it ungrateful not to repose such confidence in him --a
better man cannot be found.' Such are the convictions of colourings
under which public affairs have been abandoned implicitly to his control.
Without using then untruths to defame Mr. Washington, we place him by a new
estimate of his character exactly where he ought to be placed, from the
moment that he perverts his reputation to a fatal public use. All we
assert is accompanied with proof, or with notoriety which supercedes proof;
and our conclusions are short of what our data warrant. --Never were there
greater interests at stake, than at the present crisis, and never a man more
capable of disserving them by a spurious fame, than Mr.
* Some have pretended that the treaty
was calculated to meet the hypothesis of the English being the masters of
the whole French West Indies; whence it was supposed that it would be
in their power to open or shut to America the commerce of all that part
of the world. These sordid views, these false politics, we have
not put to the account of Mr. Washington, even hypothetically. |
 |
| 30 |
Washington; who not only often acts ill from his own judgment and feelings,
but from those of others. --After all, have we done wrong; unjust censure is
but retarded praise, and the public will amply repay to him any momentary
suspense of its admiration. But have we done right; then it will
become the public to act in consequence.
For transactions which are passed, accounts are more
than settled between the public and Mr. Washington. A Virginia planter
by no means the most eminent, a militia-officer ignorant of war both in
theory and useful practice*, and a politician certainly not of the first
magnitude; such was the outset of this gentleman in the American
revolution. He was therefore paid in advance, when he was suddenly
made commander in chief; a post which thought filled only in the matter
related, he retained for about eight years. Equally inefficient and
somewhat more mischievous as a politician, he has enjoyed the Presidency of
the United States for eight other years. All this with other
occasional tokens of respect, and with a superabundance of fame, and the
prompt reimbursement of his expences, is certainly an ample return for none
or bad services, in a cause which was his own, as well as that of humanity
and his country. The charge of ingratitude hitherto then rests
not with the public, but with Mr. Washington; for be his motives what they
may, seldom under the mask of merit has any man attempted greater mischiefs.
But it is necessary here to criticize those, for such
there are, who seek for compensations and make-weights among the virtues;
and who pretend that the public man who does some things right, has a
fund of merit, from which to counterbalance what he may do wrong.
This is analogous to the Roman catholic doctrine of works of super-erogation;
the religious sophism supporting that one individual may lend his
superfluity of merit to another, and the political sophism implying that one
virtue my [sic; may] atone for the defect of anotherl. But the
answer is, that, there is no excess of what is really virtue. We owe
to virtue all of what is virtue, and if any surplus in a virtue were
possible, yet in its secondary sense it would operate as a vice if it
dispensed with any other virtue. --Has Mr. Washington done well as a
general? be it so; but because he has done well in the field, is he to do
ill in the cabinet? --This exactness
* We do not forget the virgin public
act of Mr. Washington, when in his early youth he gave a fairer promise of
political and military ardor, than he afterwards realized. It would be
ungenerous to reproach him with want of success in this attempt; and
therefore we only limit the anecdote to its proper class, and say that what
occurred in the back countries has little relation to other scenes.
|
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| 31 |
of account with the servants of the public will diminish neither their
number nor their zeal. If one of the Scipios repented him of the good
done his country, because his country in the sequel made light of him; yet
his displeasure has not prevented Mr. Washington (who will surely be
allowed to have read his story) from performing whatever his adherents find
admirable in his military and political conduct. Mr. Washington
also, if a real republican, must confess that republicans should be trained
even as to their tempers; and be able to bear hardships of the mind
as well as of the body; looking for the reward of virtue in itself,
whenever the public decides ill concerning them. To be effeminately
tender of the individual is to be unpitying towards the public; and it is
even an encouragement to individuals to make the public subordinate to their
personal ambition.
What is said of the impropriety of transferring one
virtue to stand in the place of another, applies still more against an
attempt to make private hold the place of public virtue. The supposed
private virtues of the present monarch of Great Britain have so little
served his empire, that we have repeatedly during his reign seen it on the
brink of ruin; and America knows that it is during this boasted
period, that its own safety required a separation from him. An example
so apposite may put us on our guard respecting the private pretensions of
general Washington. In truth to be sober and chaste and church-going,
can be no security for a complete catalogue of the private virtues;
and how much less for such virtues (and talents too) as are of a public
nature.
If we are charged with too close an attention to the
faults of Mr. Washington, we reply that it is our very object to search
out his faults; and that it is left to others to praise him. --Yet there
is a certain kind of justice which we shall not refuse to him. It
shall be allowed that upon occasion he can be firm; and that in difficult
moments of the American revolution, he has had the praise of never
despairing of the republic. In saying that he is brave, we give him
small flattery; for it is the uniform quality of the French armies, though
so numerous and miscellaneous*. Upon ordinary occasions also he may
safely be trusted at the head of a considerable military corps; for he is in
war not only firm and brave, but prudent; but these qualities by no means
imply penetrating observa-[tion] *
Voltaire says, that 'courage is not a virtue, but a fortunate quality; of
which rogues partake as well as great men.' It is certainly one of
those qualities which all men would possess, were it in their power;
but which if it is not given by nature, can only come by means of sense and
practice. |
 |
| 32 |
[observa-]tion, large views, or a promptness and fertility in resources.
He is an industrious writer of dispatches, but had he retrenched from his
labor in this respect when in military command, in order to visit his
distant posts after the manner of the republican generals of France, he
would more rarely perhaps have suffered the loss of these. His conduct
is more disinterested than was that of the Duke of Marlborough; but he is
not less ambitious, though not quite so successful as that general. He
is too artful to have the air of seeking office, and yet we must add, that
when possessed of office, he appears to have availed himself to the utmost
of all its authority and pomp. He loves in the aristocratical sense of
the word, what is called order; that is, he wishes that every man
should remain in his place, and especially that the aristocracy should
remain in their places; thinking with all of the latter, that the
smallest change in this would dissolve society. He loves good faith in
pecuniary transactions being himself a man of property. He has no
hatred to the lower orders of society, but neither has he any active
philanthropy for them; since few really love what they do not also
respect. --In short whoever seeks in Mr. Washington an Alfred to form a
nation, or a Czar Peter to visit every country and profession for
improvement, or a Franklin who could be self-taught, or a Howard who could
feel for distant misery; will seek it in vain. Mr. Washington thought
with an ample fortune, and though the measure was not likely to entail
responsibility; yet never travelled for military instruction himself, nor
sent for any military adviser from Europe, to prepare himself or his country
for the struggle in arms with England, which was likely to follow the
political controversy with it. Incapable therefore either of grandeur
or originality in his ideas, or his measures, we can only expect in him
whatever is found prevailing among the class of grave men of his age and
country, moderately improved by the advantages of education and possessed of
considerable habits of application.
But qualifications of this
kind, even were they more abundant, can never make it proper for America to
become hood-winked with awe in their presence. It is sufficient that
the services of Mr. Washington were exacted from him by duty, and more than
paid for by fame and power, to entitle the public to scan his faults with
justice. He is but a man, and
* Lord Bacon says, that grave
husbands are faithful to their wives from habit. The same habit which
makes them constant in some of the virtues, renders them as fixed in
some of the vices. |
 |
| 33 |
certainly not a great man. A considerable revolution seeming to
require considerable attainments, he has been allowed to fill the chief post
of fame on this occasion upon sufferance, though he himself is the person
who has prevented its being properly filled by others; consequently he is
but a tenant at will in the public opinion. The fiction
employed in his favour was at least generous, and might have been useful;
but he has been wanting in his part for supporting it; thus difficult is it
to trust any with a power which they have not known how to earn by intrinsic
worth.
The question then remains, whether nature has been so
sparing to America, that Mr. Washington cannot find it more than his
counter-part. His own quietism must indeed have flattened every thing
in America into stupidity, if grand principles and agitated times have not
as usual given scope to genius and character, of which nature ever where
provides the rudiments. It must at the same time be a singular
infatuation which prefers disappointment to hope, or old materials which
have failed to new ones which give promise. The sons of America must
be greatly bastardized, if good men and true are not to be found, unless in
the hapless school of Mr. Washington. --Should America however be reduced to
the strange alternative of pronouncing between herself and him, she will
surely remember that she gave birth even to Mr. Washington; and that if her
powers of production are since enfeebled, it can only be owing to the
twice eight years of pre-eminence in American affairs given to this
gentleman.
It is not permitted to trifle in a case of immense
present interest, and of which the wide relations will more and more
multiply with time. Half or perhaps the whole of the Western
Hemisphere is in question. The American family not content as in the
Eastern Hemisphere, with merely supporting its numbers by giving one birth
for every death, is overspreading its wild regions with a new and sudden
population. Nature, though acting only by her fixed laws, proceeds as
rapidly here as she would do by twin-births in elder countries*; and
it is no longer a speculative hypothesis, that several new Chinas depend in
some measure on what happens to the United States. --What a dust then in the
balance of worlds is Mr. Washington; and how criminal to be deterred from an
act of duty by a false candour either to him or his
* An American need not be told that in a new country where
children are supported with peculiar ease from an abundance in the means of
subsistence, and are at the same time peculiarly useful from the want of
hands; marriage in youth becomes universal and children are
multiplied in proportion. |
 |
| 34 |
adherents! Willingly to permit evil, is a guilt little short of
committing it; and to calumniate him who detects evil, is a still more
active step towards a participation in it. The United States however
must not be content with shunning evil in all its shapes: Both
interest and duty require efforts in favor of positive good, proportioned to
the amplitude of their prospects. --Every thing therefore demands the
extinction of the Washingtonian credit, the passport of so many weak or bad
measures. We must no longer be deceived by masks; and simulated merit
or dissembling crime must equally stand bare to the touch of truth.
BUT the same experience which tells us, that America ought not to place
confidence in individuals, tells us that she is nevertheless too prone to do
it. To remove therefore the double defect of a deceiving individual,
and a credulous or indolent public; it is indispensible to perfect by
legitimate means the federal government of America, and such indeed of the
state governments as partake of its defects. --Virginia, which first founded
the alarm-bell of liberty with respect to the stamp act, which never fails
to exhibit respectable public men; and whose chief regret since it has seen
him become retrograde, is the having given birth and countenance to Mr.
Washington; Virginia has again signalized herself by four wide resolutions
at the present crisis*. These should immediately be carried into
effect by a constitutional process.
* 'Resolved,
That the Senators representing this state in the Senate of the United
States, be, and they are hereby instructed, and the Representatives
requested, to unite their utmost exertions, to obtain in their respective
Houses, the following amendments to the Constitution, viz.
1. That no treaty containing any stipulation upon
the subject of the powers vested in Congress by the eighth section of the
first article, shall become the supreme law of the land, until it shall have
been approved in those particulars, by a majority in
the House of Representatives; and, that the President before he shall ratify
any such treaty shall submit the same to the House of Representatives.
2. That a tribunal, other than the Senate be instituted for the trial
of impeachments. 3. That the Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by by the Legislature
thereof for three years, and each Senator have one vote: Immediately
after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they
shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seat of
the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the
first year; of the second class at the expiration of the
second year; and of the third class at the expiration of the
third year, so that one third may be chosen at the expiration of every year.
4. That no person holding the office of a Judge under the United
States, shall be capable of holding at the same time any other office or
appointment whatever.'
Besides these changes, none should enjoy the chief
executive uninterruptedly, even by the voice of their fellow
citizens. Politicians refresh their knowledge and feelings by mixing
for a time with their fellow citizens; and in the interval may |
 |
| 35 |
What regards the head of the federal executive
government is however most pressing, since there is no immediate control
over it existing in the Senate; which, as at present constituted, knows but
too well how to enter into compromise and even into league with the
executive. In the independent times of the antient republics, no one
thought of giving to a general a supreme command close |
