

University of North Carolina at Asheville

The Judgment of Fred Tayama and Exoneration of Harry Ueno:
An Intergenerational Perspective on the Revolt of Manzanar During the Japanese
American Internment Era

A Senior Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of the Department of History
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts in History

by
Graham Hildreth

Asheville, North Carolina
20 November 2007

On December 5th, 1942, at around 8:00 P.M., six masked men assaulted Fred Tayama in his barracks. Severely beaten, receiving lacerations to his head and face, Tayama was the first victim of what soon would become a mass demonstration against the United States government. Ironically, it was just the day before that he had attended the national convention of the Japanese American Citizens League in Salt Lake City, representing the entire ten thousand internees at the Manzanar Relocation Center. After Tayama had been discovered unconscious and bleeding in his cramped apartment barrack, he was quickly rushed to the camp's hospital, receiving treatment for his wounds given by fellow internees. Soon a crowd of about seventy-five protestors, a culmination of internal tensions among different Japanese factions, would burst into the hospital seeking to finish the job that the masked men started mere hours earlier.¹ The events that followed sparked one of the most explosive riots witnessed during the Japanese American internment.

Ultimately, there were many complicated and far-reaching elements attributed to fueling the riot of Manzanar: from the mass internment without *habeas corpus* of the Japanese American population, to the dissolution of their personal properties while interned. However, at the core of the conflict the most pivotal factor was the intergenerational differences of custom and culture between fellow internees. It was the government's decision to bypass the Japanese American's natural leadership in the community and supplanting that with an artificial hierarchy based on the J.A.C.L. In this case study of the interned populations of Southern California's Manzanar Relocation Center, the cultural history of the Japanese Americans and its subsequent manipulation

¹ Harlan D. Unrau, *The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry During World War II* (Manzanar: United States Department of the Interior, 1996), 2: 477-479.

by the United States government led to one of the most violent and devastating incidents during the internment process.

Manzanar was the first of the ten relocation centers established. Operating between June 1st, 1942 and November 21st, 1945, it was situated in the Southern California mountain range and managed by the military.² The camp served as “home to the largest and most feared concentration of Japanese Americans on the West Coast.” Among the over ten thousand Japanese Americans that entered Manzanar, eighty-eight percent came from Los Angeles County, with seventy-two percent of the total from the City of Los Angeles.³ Although there were other cases of protest and riots inside other camps such as Poston, Heart Mountain, Topaz, and Tule Lake, among the over one hundred thousand Japanese Americans interned nationwide, the most serious case of revolt was that of Manzanar.⁴

Historians, political scientists, and sociologists have long labored to explain the decision to relocate Japanese Americans and its effects. Cultural historians have looked at the impacts of relocation on the assimilation of immigrants, while economic historians traced the correlations between economic successes of Japanese immigrants and anti-Japanese sentiments.⁵ The preeminent historian on the subject, Professor Roger Daniels of the University of Cincinnati, has long been an analyst of these unhappy events. In his book *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* he portrays the study of

² Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry Kitano, *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), 12-92.

³ Lon Kurashige, “Resistance, Collaboration, and Manzanar Protest,” *The Pacific Historical Review* 70, no.3 (2001): 387-415.

⁴ Daniels, Taylor, and Kitano, 15-20.

⁵ Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26-89; Leonard Broom and John Kitsuse, *The Managed Casualty: The Japanese American Family in World War II* (Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1973),

internment from the standpoint of national security risks and Japanese loyalties. He argues that, “the World War II civil liberties record prefigured the future in which an increasingly powerful federal bureaucracy would exercise more surveillance and potential control over groups and individuals deemed to be deviants.”⁶

In regards to the general discussion on the subject of Japanese American internment, there are an abundance of secondary sources available to the public. Many historians and political scientists have created works offering sufficient dating, events, and individuals involved. Mikiso Hane’s “Wartime Internment” and *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress*, by authors Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H.L. Kitano are good examples of general studies of internment, each tracing the events spanning the decades before, leading up to, and the actual internment of the Japanese Americans.⁷

Another trend among historians is to examine the bureaucratic process involved in the removal and return of Japanese Americans. *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress* by Mitchell T. Maki, Harry Kitano, and Megan S. Berthold shows how historiography has effectively sourced the political documentation and elaborated on the general sentiments of the U.S. government and public. The most detailed work regarding such legislation is *Personal Justice Denied* by The Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. Through the collection

1-37; Sylvia Yanagisako, *Transforming the Past: Tradition and Kinship Among Japanese Americans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 6-89.

⁶ Roger Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* (Malabar: Krieger Publishing, 1975), 3-6.

⁷ Mikiso Hane, “Wartime Internment,” *The Journal of American History* 77, no.2 (1990): 569-575; Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry Kitano, *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), 12-92; Lane Hirabayashi, *The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1999), 3-163; Roger Daniels,

of “contemporaneous memoranda, writings, transcribed conversations, memoirs, and testimony,” it argues against the legality of the entire relocation process, citing official documentation in support of the commission’s stance.⁸

In contrast, relatively few historians have focused specifically on individual camps and their inhabitants. Scholarly works tend to deal with the events by examining the demographic group as a whole. Examples illustrating this focus are *Inside an American Concentration Camp* by Richard S. Nishimoto and *Concentration Camps: North America*, by Roger Daniels.⁹ Both works detail individual camps, but offer little in regards to personal accounts or descriptive narrative. It is through the examination of oral accounts, personal narrative, and government documentation that one can truly see the magnitude of the internment’s consequence.

Regarding intergenerational discrepancies between Manzanar’s and other camps’ internees, historiography typically lacks emphasis on the subject. Researchers and historians have largely overlooked the many differing elements between the Japanese American generations as a major cause of internee tensions. The Issei were Japanese immigrants to the U.S. and denied citizenship. Their children were the Nisei, born in the United States, possessed U.S. citizenship, and were often more assimilated into American society than their parents. There were also the Kibei, who were born from the Issei in the

“Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective,” *The History Teacher* 35, no.3 (2002): 297-310.

⁸ Roger Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans* (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1975), 3-135; Mitchell Maki, Harry Kitano, and Megan Berthold, *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 58-127; Report on the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, *Personal Justice Denied* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), 25-295.

⁹ Richard S. Nishimoto, *Inside an American Concentration Camp: Japanese American Resistance at Poston, Arizona* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1995), 3-163; Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps: North America* (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1989), 1-144; Sandra C. Taylor, *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1-

United States, thus being citizens, but were sent to Japan in their early adolescence to receive their education, but later came back to the U.S. to live and work.¹⁰ Despite historiography's general use of an empirical methodology when looking at Japanese American internment, several historians have applied psycho-historical approaches in study of the intergenerational differences with varying success. *Removal and Return* by Leonard Broom traces the economic disparities between the generations of the interned and Emiko's Omori documentation of first-hand accounts of internees in *Rabbit in the Moon* illustrated how the generational differences were magnified in internment.¹¹

The unique approach that is taken in this paper relies predominately on the fact that there were multiple variables at play that contributed to Manzanar's revolt. Historians have looked at why this event occurred, and they have also looked at intergenerational differences between internees. However, historiography hasn't placed the two together, nor has it cited internee generational tensions as *the* major catalyst for causing the riot. From the minor differences that existed in the pre-war community, to the magnified hostilities created by Manzanar's administration, the specific focus on intergenerational discrepancies between internees sheds new light on a well-developed field of history.

Yet before evacuation occurred, it was the day after Pearl Harbor that the United States government began its mass persecutions against Japanese Americans. It began aggressively seeking "enemy aliens" along the West Coast, and having just been attacked

227; Louis Fiset, *Imprisoned Impart: The World War II Correspondence of an Issei Couple* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 3-113.

¹⁰ Unrau, 477-523; Kurashige, 387-415.

¹¹ Donna K. Nagata, *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment* (New York: Plenum Press, 1993), 26-183; Leonard Broom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese Americans* (Berkeley:

by Japan, this mainly constituted those of Japanese ancestry. By the end of the first day there were seven hundred and thirty-seven Japanese Americans in federal custody. Former California Attorney General Earl Warren stated, “the Japanese situation in California was the Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort... unless something is done, it may bring about a repetition of Pearl Harbor.”¹² The following spring, Executive Order 9066 was issued, calling for the relocation of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast. The U.S. government made known that the evacuation was done to rid the coast of potential threats, as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson argued for the “protection of vital installations against sabotage and espionage.”¹³

The evacuation had varied affects on the different generations of Japanese Americans. Many Nisei were highly assimilated into American culture, thus being “horrified and shocked” when they learned of their eminent removal and internment.¹⁴ The Issei and Kibei, who shared similar social-standings in the U.S., were outraged as well, but showed less resistance to the movement. For the Issei this was due to their illegal-status in America, therefore making them less willing to publicly condemn the United States government.¹⁵ For the Kibei it had more to do with the group’s preexisting tendencies of disconnectedness and dislike for the American government, as they were the group most often singled out by it. Lieutenant General J.L. DeWitt publicly

University of California Press, 1978), 1-124; *Rabbit in the Moon*, directed by Emiko Omori, 85 minutes, New Day Films, 1999, videocassette.

¹² Daniels, Taylor, and Kitano, 15.

¹³ Henry L. Stimson to General DeWitt, February 10, 1942, “Document 14-C of Record Group 107,” The National Archives, Washington DC, sourced from Roger Daniels, *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*, 117-119.

¹⁴ George Fukasawa, interviewed by Arthur Hansen, August 12, 1974, found at California State University’s Oral History Program at Fullerton, “Japanese American World War II Evacuation Oral History Project.” <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/texts> [hereinafter referred to as “The California State Oral History Program”].

¹⁵ Kurashige, 405.

proclaimed that the “thousands of American-born Japanese that had gone to Japan to receive their education and indoctrination there had become rapidly pro-Japanese and then returned to the United States,” thus representing the main threat amongst their community.¹⁶

Ironically though, many of Manzanar’s internees were well off, business owning Nisei who regarded themselves as purely American. However, there were also large populations of both Kibei and Issei in the camp as well, possessing mixed pro-Japanese and pro-American leanings.¹⁷ Under normal circumstances, this combination of social groups would not have necessarily resided or interacted with one another outside of the camp.¹⁸ As the interment process began this volatile mix, forced upon the community, offered the administration surprising amounts of quandaries. Also, Manzanar internees were mostly an urban people, uprooted some three hundred miles away to a bleak and rural location in California’s Sierra Nevada Mountains.¹⁹

Yet, the location was not the only stressor placed upon the newly evacuated community. They were put into clapboard barracks, received army rations, and shared communal latrines detached from their housing. There were also the ubiquitous barbed-wire fences and guard towers that combined the internees’ dislocation and misery.²⁰ One Manzanar internee complained:

¹⁶ Lieutenant General J.L. DeWitt, *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942*, Chief of Staff’s Office, 1943, found at the Museum of the City of San Francisco, “Chronology of San Francisco War Events,” <http://www.sfmuseum/1906/ww2.html> [hereinafter referred to as “Museum of the City of San Francisco”].

¹⁷ Harold S. Jacoby, Sample newspapers from relocation centers, “Little Tokyos Again?,” *Topaz Times*, May 6, 1943, “Museum of the City of San Francisco.”

¹⁸ Kurashige, 387-390.

¹⁹ Arthur Hansen and David Hacker, “Manzanar Riot: Ethnic Perspective,” 116-20, sourced from Unrau, 521-523.

²⁰ Kurashige, 391.

There were no trees, nothing green, it was all brown and there was this mountain just sitting behind us. By the time we arrived there, they were in the middle of a dust storm. You couldn't open your mouth because all the dust would come in. You could just barely see, and the only way to keep your eyes clean was just to cry and let the tears wash your eyes out. Inside your ears, up your nostrils, you could just feel the grit and the grime, and when you rubbed your teeth together, you could feel all this sand. It was a horrible feeling, and there was total confusion.²¹

The construction and management of all relocation centers were developed as the evacuation process went along, often rendering them substandard and in poor condition. First in the hands of the Alien Control Unit under the Department of Justice, management was later transferred to the Army through its quasi-civilian agency, the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Finally, around the late spring of 1942, the reigns of authority were ultimately passed to the federally mandated War Relocation Authority.²²

One of the first things initiated by the newly formed W.R.A. was the creation of self-government among the internees, designed to help them adjust to their sudden change in circumstance. At first as the system developed, the internees were free to elect representatives from their housing blocks to deal formally with the administration. However, once the W.R.A. assumed control in June 1942, groups of American-born Nisei sought to overthrow the existing internee authority that consisted mainly of Issei.²³

A majority of these Nisei challengers were in fact members of the Japanese American Citizens League, under the support of Manzanar's administration. Formed by Nisei who wanted a more expedient and formal assimilation process in America, before internment the J.A.C.L. largely represented the moving force behind the propagation of

²¹ Amy Uno Ishii, interviewed by Kristin Mitchell, July 9 and July 20, 1973, "The California State Oral History Program."

²² Arthur Hansen, *The Oral History Program: Introduction*, (Fullerton: The California State University, 1991), 1-10.

²³ Daniels, *Concentration Camps: North America*, 144.

American values within the Japanese American community. Forming sub-groups such as the Anti-Axis League, working close with the F.B.I. and local police forces, and acting as public spokespeople for their housing-districts were but a few ways that the J.A.C.L. sought to establish itself as a distinctly pro-American group.²⁴ These close ties with American society, government, and culture before internment separated the Nisei from other Japanese immigrants, but during internment created mass suspicion of the organization.

The alliance between Manzanar's administration and the J.A.C.L. was in part due to the fact that all of the internment camps maintained a policy in which meetings among internees were restricted to English only. Since most Issei and Kibei didn't speak English as fluently as the Nisei, the J.A.C.L. came to be favored by the government's management.²⁵ Leading the organization in vouching for Nisei leadership was a businessman out of Los Angeles name Fred Tayama. The exclusion of Issei and Kibei from the self-government within Manzanar was most pronounced in the administration's obvious preference for Nisei authority. By denying Issei leadership positions in such projects as the Manzanar newspaper, the camp's frequent work furloughs, and the military-supply manufacturer created the first and most important rift among the internees. This in turn led to some significant, if not always blatant, cases of resistance. These protests towards exclusion ultimately became embracing of any and all grievances held among internees towards the United States government and the W.R.A.²⁶

It was under these pretenses that the Nisei in Manzanar came to embody much of the pro-administration sentiment. Inside the camp, the J.A.C.L. members maintained

²⁴ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

²⁵ Kurashige, 391.

their stance of cooperation with the American authorities, amidst the turbulence created by the Issei and Kibei.²⁷ Contributing to the perception of blind devotion among the Nisei was the fact that they made up the entire internal security force of Manzanar, with any crime or grievance investigated by this group. Already distrusted by most Issei and Kibei, by not placing either group in a significant position of maintaining evacuee safety and protection only furthered these groups' feelings of enmity towards the administration and the Nisei authority.²⁸ Nonetheless, throughout internment, the Nisei held to their pro-American practices, such as encouraging their children to speak English, promoting women's involvement in community affairs, holding pro-American drives, and maintaining "a faith that their citizenship is being and will be respected by the courts and the vast majority of the American people."²⁹

It was on the other end of the spectrum that the Issei and Kibei became lumped together as "enemy aliens" in the eyes of the administration due to their decidedly pro-Japanese tendencies and close cultural-ties.³⁰ Falsely charged as individuals capable of committing "all the horrors possible" in pre-war American society, once interned Issei and Kibei increasingly expressed anti-American sentiments against the community's Nisei leaders and resented Manzanar's white staff and management.³¹ They began to flaunt their preference for Japanese culture by listening to Japanese music, singing

²⁶ Unrau, 500-506.

²⁷ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

²⁸ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

²⁹ Tanaka and Masaoka, *Documentary Report 47*, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, August 12, 1942, quoted and sourced in Lon Kurashige, "Resistance, Collaboration, and Manzanar Protest," *The Pacific Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (2001): 392.

³⁰ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

³¹ Tom C. Clark, interviewed by Jerry N. Hess, October 24, 1972, found at the Truman Presidential Museum and Library, "War Relocation Authority and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during WWII," <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/library.htm> [hereinafter referred to as "Truman Presidential Museum and Library"].

nationalistic songs, and dancing to traditional folk dances.³² Thus, the disparities between the internees became strikingly overt as the months passed by in Manzanar, boiling to a point in which their frustrations could not be held back any longer.

At the forefront of that frustration was the Nisei led J.A.C.L. Many internees felt betrayed and looked down upon by those of the group, and asserted that the J.A.C.L. was more interested in promoting themselves than looking after the community at large. In fact, many internees who had once supported the J.A.C.L. rebuked the organization for not protecting them from day one of the evacuation. When the J.A.C.L. came out with a policy of full cooperation and compliance with the United States' government, "they felt they were let down terrifically. They thought the J.A.C.L. should carry the fight and that if they had taken different views on this thing, the evacuation might not have ever taken place."³³

Almost all Japanese Americans, whether Issei, Nisei, or Kibei, had experienced some degree of racism before ever entering the internment process. In the years prior to evacuation many had already lost faith in the federal government due to anti-immigration legislation such as the Gentlemen's Agreement Act and the Immigration Act of 1924.³⁴ This was particularly painful for Issei, as many originally planned on returning to Japan once they had worked in the U.S. for a few years, and/or go to school here and then go back to Japan.³⁵ Now dealing with the process of internment and suffering inside the camp, the practice of the American government drafting the internees of Manzanar only added to this sense of widespread prejudice.

³² Kurashige, 392.

³³ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

³⁴ Hane, 569.

In fact, during internment over eighteen thousand Japanese Americans served in the U.S. Army.³⁶ Famed for its heroism in combat zones such as France and Italy, the all-Japanese American 442nd Battalion eventually received more honors than any other squadron in World War II.³⁷ But most Issei did not see the justice in the War Department's attempts at drafting Nisei while they were interned. One internee stated, "When they came to draft the Japanese boys to be in the army, I was against that. I thought that my son was an American citizen, yet, they put him into a relocation camp. I wasn't going to let him go to the army, to work for that kind of government."³⁸

According to internee accounts, the first major signs of anti-administration sentiments at Manzanar came about on July 20, 1942, following an announcement from Washington that Kibei would not be allowed to leave the camp on government sanctioned worker's furloughs. The federal government increasingly viewed Kibei as subversive and more likely than other Japanese Americans to do harm. The National Director of the War Relocation Authority, Dillon S. Myer stated in a speech to evacuees, "They don't want your contribution for the time being. They are making a great deal of money without you. Consequently, they are telling us it is not safe to send Kibei."³⁹ The government thus denied them access to agricultural labor in California's beet fields that it allowed other internees across the West Coast. Many of the Kibei, already troubled

³⁵ Yoriyuki Kikuchi, interviewed by Arthur Hansen, July 29, 1974, "The California State Oral History Program."

³⁶ Committee on Appropriations, *Statement and Testimony of Dillon S. Myer*, House of Representatives, April 30, 1945, 3-7, "Truman Presidential Museum and Library," [hereinafter referred to as "Statement and Testimony of Dillon S. Myer"].

³⁷ Statement and Testimony of Dillon S. Myer, "Truman Presidential Museum and Library."

³⁸ Hyotaro Kaneko, interviewed by Marsha Bode, January 23, 1984, "The California State Oral History Program."

³⁹ Dillon S. Myer, Speech, *Mass Meeting of the Residents in Minidoke Project Gymnasium, February 19, 1945, 2:00 PM*, "Truman Presidential Museum and Library."

because of language conflicts, ideologies, and lifestyle, felt that holding them in the camp was an act of great discrimination because they were in fact American citizens.⁴⁰

Coinciding with this was the wage disparity created between Manzanar's workers. The Nisei working in the camp received two to three times higher wages than those of the Issei and Kibei.⁴¹ Because of this, many Kibei openly denounced their American citizenship and pledged their allegiance to Japan at a public meeting in early August. Led by anti-administration leaders, such pronouncements presented an opportunity for many Nisei to point out that there was a growing portion of "dangerous, pro-Japanese forces in the camp whose avowed purpose was to smash any constructive program of the administration and make the camp a prison for Japs."⁴² This of course was an exaggeration, but the growing number of disenchanting internees was not.

Distrust of Manzanar's administration quickly spread to questioning of the internee's loyalties as well. Even as the United States government sent out questionnaires asking internees to declare their support for either the U.S. or Japan, the generational rift grew wider.⁴³ As the former W.R.A. community analyst Morris Edward Opler stated, "The Manzanar protestors ultimately opposed the J.A.C.L. collaborators because these Americanized Nisei violated the cultural norms, traditions, and conservatism of the community at large." Many of the Issei and Kibei began moving in

⁴⁰ Hirabayashi, 25-27.

⁴¹ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

⁴² Unrau, 515.

⁴³ Emiko Omori, *Rabbit in the Moon*, [Sourced information deals with questionnaires handed out in internment camps by the federal government. These documents asked internees about numerous things pertaining to camp life, but most important to this study were Questions 27 and 28. These in particular sought to uncover internee national and political allegiances, asking if they would one, serve in the United States Army, and two, if they would swear no more allegiance to the Japanese Emperor. Many Nisei took no issue with the Questionnaire and answered both questions, whereas many Issei and Kibei refused. Preeminent Japanese American internment historian Roger Daniels called the questionnaire the "forerunner of McCarthyism"].

an “underground” sort of way, trying secretly to weed out internee informers and traitors.⁴⁴

According to numerous accounts given by internees, some in the communities even went as far as forming local gangs in their search for “traitors.” Comprised mostly of Kibei who were becoming increasingly withdrawn from the community at large, these groups often acted subversively towards the administration. There were two Kibei groups in particular that drew the most attention: the Black Dragon Society and the Blood Brothers. They were notorious in the Manzanar camp for beating and threatening suspected spies. These incidents ranged from simple “heckling” of the camp’s factory workers, to cases like the one when an internee was nearly beaten to death by members of the Black Dragons when he would not quit his volunteer job at the camp’s camouflage-netting manufacturing plant; a job he was not even getting paid to do.⁴⁵

According to the W.R.A., the first attacks from the gangs were targeted against the internee’s government program. One internee recalls Kibei groups who renounced their American citizenship and sought to return to Japan. Some even began hanging barrack flags as a sign of defiance that looked suspiciously like Japanese flags.⁴⁶ Others began their protest by drawing the emblem of a rising sun on their shirts and blatantly expressing their disdain for the white administration. There soon came about several clashes with internal security in August 1942. An internee explains, “When the relationship between internees and the government was made hard, we refused to do

⁴⁴ Kurashige, 395.

⁴⁵ Fukasawa, “The California State Oral History Program,” Unrau, 510.

⁴⁶ Nishimoto, 40-42.

anything in the camp. The laundry stopped. Foods were backed up. It was like a strike.”⁴⁷

As mentioned earlier, the young gangs began focusing on the military’s use of internee labor in a camouflage-netting manufacturer held within Manzanar. This project became controversial within the camp because of a contract signed by the administration and the U.S. government allowing only Nisei to be hired for its positions involving military production.⁴⁸ Other targets included the Manzanar Cooperative, which acted as the internee government, delegating jobs and money within the camp. The Kibei and Issei claimed this was “an obvious plot to impoverish us Japanese” because they were so often excluded from such jobs and began threatening revolt without proper restitution. Soon the camp’s education program came under protest, as their pro-Japanese sentiments grew, claiming, “We don’t need a useless American education.” Finally, it was the work furlough project in the sugar beet fields that became protested. In attempt to discourage other internees from joining the program, they proclaimed that “the white man told us to get out of California; now they want to use us as economic serfs. Do not go on furlough.”⁴⁹ Using intimidation and threats of violence, the internee gangs sought to hinder the administrations control over the populations and assert their voices about the injustice of their relocation.

As confusion in the camp grew worse, many Japanese Americans began to notice a change taking place within their own families as well. As we have seen, many of the younger Kibei began forming groups and gangs as a statement of their discontent and

⁴⁷ Katsume Mukaeda, interviewed by Paul F. Clark, May 22, 1975, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁴⁸ Sue Kunitomi Embrey, interviewed by Arthur A. Hansen, David A. Hacker, and David J. Bertagnoli, August 24 and November 15, 1973, “The California State Oral History Program.”

anger. But many of the younger Nisei also began to become estranged from their Issei parents as well. With the camp administration's allotment of authority given to the older Nisei, there became an erosion in the validity of the Issei leadership. Children were allowed to eat in separate mess halls from their parents, the amount of free time created disconnectedness from the families as children wandered where they wished, and the patriarchal role of providing food, shelter, and protection by the Issei was dissolved because the camp's administration was now doing all that.⁵⁰ As Manzanar internee George Fukasawa asserted, "There was a breakdown in a number of structures, the greatest of which was the family. The Issei man who traditionally headed the family found that, through circumstances in the camp, he didn't have a family anymore."⁵¹ It was from this change in familial and societal roles that further disillusionment was fostered, leading to the destructive events on December 5th, 1942.

Late on a Saturday afternoon, a small group of frustrated and angry Kibei and Issei targeted Fred Tayama for his involvement with the J.A.C.L. and his role as a suspected informant with the F.B.I. and other government organizations. Beaten unmercifully, his injuries were not fatal but he was rushed to the camp's hospital.⁵² This attack was purportedly linked with not only Tayama's considerable involvement with the J.A.C.L. and the F.B.I., but rumors spread placing him in support of the War Department's drafting of Nisei for the American military. The culmination of Tayama's

⁴⁹ Unrau, 515.

⁵⁰ Kenko Yamashita, interviewed by Mariko Yamashita, August 10, 1978, "The California State Oral History Program."

⁵¹ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

⁵² War Relocation Authority, *Memorandum to the Director: A Report Concerning the Incident at the Manzanar Relocation Center on December 5 and 6, 1942; Records of US Army Commands, December 22, 1943*, sourced from The National Historic Sites, *A Historical Study of the Manzanar War Relocation Center* (Manzanar: National Park Service, 1996), 478-518, [hereinafter referred to as "WRA, Memorandum"].

suspected activities in service of the camp's administration placed him at the forefront of those targeted by the anti-administration groups seeking to rid their community of such "traitors."⁵³

As Tayama soon came to represent the pro-government population of Manzanar, he also came to represent the injustices of relocation to many of the Kibei and Issei. In contrast, Harry Ueno became the leader of the resistance. As the W.R.A. report submitted on December 22, 1942 suggested, "Ueno was very popular at Manzanar. Tayama was despised as an informer and a stool pigeon. The spark that set off the incident was the arrest of Ueno."⁵⁴

Although Tayama could not identify his assailants, he was sure that Ueno was one. Tayama's identification of Ueno led to his arrest and removal from Manzanar to a local jail outside of the camp. Few internees actually believed that Ueno was involved in the beating of Tayama, and felt that his history of being an outspoken critic towards the American government during internment was the real motivation behind his removal.⁵⁵

This was seen in Ueno's organization of the Kitchen Workers' Union that represented Manzanar's fifteen hundred Kibei-dominated mess hall workers. According to many internees, Ueno had done this more effectively than did Tayama in his organization of the J.A.C.L.'s Manzanar Work Corps. Nonetheless, Ueno's union was composed mainly of anti-J.A.C.L. and anti-administration Kibei and Issei, placing him in direct conflict with Tayama and his group.⁵⁶ At the request of the Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell, the Manzanar police began rounding up possible participants in

⁵³ Unrau, 516.

⁵⁴ WRA, *Memorandum*, 21.

⁵⁵ Kurashige, 392.

⁵⁶ Unrau, 479.

the assault and Ueno was chief among them. Unable to give a clear account of his activities that evening, Ueno was handcuffed and taken to a county jail, becoming the first Manzanar evacuee to be jailed outside of camp.⁵⁷

Neither Tayama nor Ueno were given a chance to plead their case in a courtroom, as none of the internees were given *habeas corpus* for their internment. Many historians have argued that the disregard for due process only further fueled the disillusionment of the interned populations, as one civil right was disregarded after another.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the events that shortly followed after Ueno's arrest and relocation from the camp led to the most fierce moment of protest and riot in the Japanese American internment.⁵⁹

It was at 10:00 A.M. on Sunday, December 6 that about two hundred evacuees assembled in the mess hall of Block 22, Ueno's former barrack, to discuss his arrest and consider ways of negotiating his release from jail.⁶⁰ After going over several plans, including a camp-wide mess hall strike, the meeting disbanded without any solid agreement made. However, a second meeting was scheduled to consist of block managers, mess hall workers, and Kibei evacuees only. This meeting was planned to begin at 1:00 P.M., also in Block 22.⁶¹

Rather than diffusing the situation, the first meeting only led to generating more involvement by other internees. News of the 1:00 meeting had spread quickly, as the crowd that gathered at Block 22 was estimated to be about two thousand, and was so big that it had to be moved outside. Shigetoshi Tateishi, a Kibei from San Francisco who

⁵⁷ Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, September 13, 1943, Report No. 61, "Statement of A Nisei, A Freshman in College, Who Is Visiting Manzanar During School Vacation" by Morris E. Opler, sourced from Unrau, 510-512.

⁵⁸ Taylor, 57.

⁵⁹ Kurashige, 404-405.

⁶⁰ Fukasawa, "The California State Oral History Program."

⁶¹ Unrau, 480.

was the internee leader of Block 23, fronted the meeting. It was here that fiery and mutinous speeches were delivered, mostly aimed at internee “traitors,” as well as the administration.⁶² Eventually, a “Committee of Five” was selected among the group to negotiate Ueno’s release from jail and his return to Manzanar. This committee included: Gengi Yamaguchi, a forty-year old Issei; Sakichi Hashimoto, a forty-two-year old Issei; Kazuo Suzukawa, a thirty-eight-year old Issei; the aforementioned Shigetoshi Tateishi; and the lead spokesmen and only Nisei in the committee, Joseph Y. Kurihara.⁶³

While the internees were organizing and growing in number, the administration called for reinforcements from inside and outside of the camp. Twelve soldiers from a local military base had arrived through the main gate of the camp and proceeded to form a line around the police station and the Administration building, mounting machine guns around the perimeter.⁶⁴ In the hopes of dispersing the crowd, the Project Director Ralph Merritt, alongside Chief of Internal Security John M. Gilkey and Commanding Officer of the Military Police Martyn Hall, walked amongst the increasingly boisterous crowd, meeting with the Committee of Five and hearing their demands. For approximately forty-five minutes they discussed possible resolutions to the conflict, but the administrators soon had to leave due to the increasing hostility of the crowd. Merritt soon decided, “The fanaticism of some members of the crowd indicated there was some imminent danger of bloodshed. The soldiers continued to be taunted and insulted. Some stones and sticks were being thrown at them by persons in the crowd.”⁶⁵

⁶² Embrey, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁶³ WRA, *Memorandum*, 21.

⁶⁴ Fukasawa, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁶⁵ Unrau, 481.

Regardless of the increased military presence, the administrators decided that they had no longer any real control over the crowd. In an attempt to avoid any serious violence, Merritt was able to direct the Committee of Five to an abandoned alleyway and persuaded them to agree to the following terms: “Ueno would be returned to the jail at Manzanar within an hour after the crowd dispersed and he would receive trial; the crowd would immediately disperse; there were to be no more mass meetings until Ueno’s case was settled; there were to be no attempts at freeing Ueno from Manzanar’s jail; all future grievances were to be discussed and negotiated with Merritt through recognized committees; and the Committee of Five would help find the assailants of Tayama and aid in maintaining law and order in the center.”⁶⁶

Acknowledging the internee’s demands, Ueno was returned to Manzanar at about 3:30 P.M under protection of military police. When the Committee of Five returned to Block 22’s mess hall to announce his arrival, they met an audience of some two to four thousand evacuees. Feeling that their role was fulfilled, the Committee of Five attempted to resign their position as spokesmen for the internees. The crowd shouted down this suggestion, as they felt that the administration had not done enough by simply returning Ueno to Manzanar, but should release him unconditionally. In addition, the crowd demanded that evacuees like Fred Tayama and other Nisei whom they suspected as being informants be permanently removed from the camp.⁶⁷

Receiving no response from the administration to their new demands, the mob soon disbanded into two main groups: one searching for Tayama to finish the job they

⁶⁶War Relocation Authority. *Report of Proceedings of the Board of Officers Convened Pursuant to Special Order No.3, Records of US Army Commands, December 10, 1942*, quoted and sourced from The National Historic Sites, *A Historical Study of the Manzanar War Relocation Center* (Manzanar: National Park Service, 1996), 478-518, [hereinafter referred to as “The Board of Officers”].

started and the other to free Ueno from his jail cell. Armed with knives, hatchets, hammers, screwdrivers, and stones, the crowd descended upon their targets with intent to kill all “stooges,” including evacuee policemen.⁶⁸ Around seventy people in the first group went to the hospital where they believed Tayama was still recovering from the earlier assault. The second crowd, consisting of some five hundred men and boys, went to the police station.⁶⁹

Notified ahead of time, the hospital personnel hid Tayama underneath an orthopedic bed covered with blankets; surprisingly, the crowd did not find him. Discouraged but still irate, the first group then dispersed into smaller groups to locate fellow “conspirators” of Tayama. But the intended victims were also warned ahead of time and had been relocated to the military police compound, where Tayama himself would soon be escorted.⁷⁰

In comparison, the second group was not so easily dismayed. In fact, the sight of over one hundred and thirty-five troops and the addition of extra military police did not turn aside the mob. Merritt soon realized that the agreement reached mere hours earlier with the Committee had been broken. Thus, he requested the military to step in and “if necessary, declare martial law.”⁷¹ The Army’s attempts at dispersing the crowd were met with the throwing of stones, sand, lit cigarettes, and insults. In fact, some internees began taunting the soldiers, calling them “boy scouts,” spat on them, and goaded them “to

⁶⁷ Unrau, 483.

⁶⁸ Kikuchi, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁶⁹ Fukasawa, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁷⁰ Embrey, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁷¹ WRA, *Memorandum*, 9-10.

shoot.” It soon came to pass that the administration and military commanders felt that the crowd would not disperse without force.⁷²

Tear gas grenades were then shot into the crowd, causing the internees to scatter swiftly amid the ensuing chaos. While most of the crowd fled into their barracks, others reformed in groups heading back towards the jail and advanced on the troops. Although no order to open fire was given to the troops, shotgun and sub-machine gun blasts issued from the squad. At the same time, a driverless automobile used by the camp’s fire chief was pushed forth towards the police station. Not seeing that the car was unmanned, the soldiers then opened fire again until it rammed into an Army truck nearby.⁷³

Amid the shootings, the crowd scattered in terror. As the dust, smoke, and panic cleared, the injured and dying were seen lying amongst the wreckage near the police station. Quickly removed to the hospital and police station, “an uneasy calm settled over the camp.” The time was about 9:30 P.M.⁷⁴

Because of the exchange, a young internee named James Ito was killed instantly. Eleven others were injured, with one dying in Manzanar’s hospital five days later. In all, four of the casualties were Nisei, two were Issei, and five were Kibei, all sustaining gun shot wounds in the side or back.⁷⁵ During the night, the camp remained in a state of chaos. Meetings, military patrols, and beatings of suspected informers continued until the morning of Sunday, December 6.⁷⁶

Without receiving a hearing or being charged, Ueno was again removed from Manzanar and transferred to another local jail outside of camp. The members of the

⁷² Unrau, 483-487.

⁷³ Unrau, 487.

⁷⁴ Embrey, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁷⁵ Unrau, 488.

Committee of Five were arrested on Sunday night, alongside of an additional eleven internees. By the end of December 15, of those arrested in connection to the riots, there were disproportionately more Issei and Kibei. Ten were Issei, ten were Kibei, and only two were Nisei.⁷⁷ All arrests were carried out by the military police and they transferred all the detained to jails outside of the camp. Ultimately, only ten of those taken were later brought back to Manzanar. The rest remained in isolation centers near Moab, Utah for “dissidents and troublemakers” from all ten relocation centers.⁷⁸

In the end, sixty-five internees had to be removed from their barracks as their names were found on several different “deathlists” created by dissident internees. Those threatened were staff members of the *Manzanar Free Press*, members of the internal security police force, and evacuees who had jobs in the center.⁷⁹ Most, if not all, had been active members in the J.A.C.L. prior to evacuation and were of the Nisei generation. Funerals were held on Monday, December 21 for both of the young men who died as a result of the incident. It was recounted as a somber and dark day, as internees felt a mixture of emotions, between grief and anger.⁸⁰

Soon after the Christmas holiday was over a sense of “normalcy” returned to the camp as both administrator and internee sought to move on from the riot. A new “Negotiating Committee” was formed to represent the evacuee population. Several meetings were held by the new committee to discuss the outcomes of the riot and potential solutions to it. Eventually the additional military police unit and soldiers were

⁷⁶ Fukasawa, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁷⁷ WRA, *Memorandum*, 17.

⁷⁸ Unrau, 490.

⁷⁹ Embrey, “The California State Oral History Program.”

⁸⁰ William Hohri, “Redress as a Movement Towards Enfranchisement,” sourced from Daniels, Taylor, and Kitano, *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress*, 196-199.

removed from the camp in early January 1943. The camp's operations fully resumed with the reopening of schools on January 10.⁸¹

Ultimately, the outcomes of the riot worked to the advantage of its instigators. Because of the removal of the sixty-five J.A.C.L. members, the Nisei lost their hold over the self-government of Manzanar. It allowed the Issei to reclaim their natural authority as patriarchs and brought back the status they had before internment as community leaders. Through the riot, the Issei and Kibei showed that their self-determination and ethnic identity would not be relinquished without a struggle. However, security in Manzanar never truly relaxed after the riots, and as one Nisei explained: "Now the politicians and such are starting all over again in trying to take Japanese American citizenship away and make things more strict in the camp. These groups should remember that over half [of interned Japanese Americans] are loyal Americans and the rest are Kibeis and Isseis. I don't see why us innocent and good guys have to pay for stuff that the Japanese do."⁸² Even with the end of the riot, the generational disparity between the Japanese Americans still remained insecure.

Looking back at the process of internment, many Japanese Americans became disenchanted and crestfallen towards the United States government. One internee wrote in his journal: "Don't tell me we were the more dangerous. Germans and Italians could get closer to any of the Defense Plants than any Japanese could have. Many Nisei have lost faith in America."⁸³ In fact, after internment many of the Issei went back to war-torn Japan to inherit land or work for family businesses. This was mostly due to the loss of

⁸¹ Unrau, 499.

⁸² Stanley Hayami, diary entry, December 14, 1942, found at The Online Archive of California, "Japanese American Relocation Digital Archive," <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/texts> [hereinafter referred to as "Japanese American Relocation Digital Archive"].

their personal property in the U.S. because of the evacuation, but many also felt disillusioned by the United States for their treatment.⁸⁴

The camp's purposes were met and fulfilled by the time the war was over in August 1945, but not until the next year did all camps eventually close. In total, the United States government spent over three hundred million dollars for the construction, maintenance, and upkeep of the "emergency refugee shelters."⁸⁵ Soon after the closings, several Nisei instituted legal actions against the American government. Their faith in the justice system was once again misplaced, however, when in three unfortunate decisions – *Hirabayashi*, *Korematsu*, and *Endo* – the courts agreed that the relocation was constitutional. This process was what Justice Frank Murphy described as a "legalization of racism."⁸⁶

Ultimately, it made sense that the Kibei and Issei were more involved with the riot. Both generations had spent most of their lives in Japan, and were inherently prone to feel some patriotism towards that country. When they became increasingly ostracized by the U.S government, it wasn't a far stretch for them to express their disdain by openly embracing their traditional heritage. The Nisei, however, never had this connection and held ties to the United States only. And in terms of the J.A.C.L., clearly the Kibei and Issei objected to being represented by a group that they didn't agree with, nor truly felt reflected their plight. The riot was the expression of the Issei and Kibei's disillusionment towards the Nisei authority and the administration that put it in power.

⁸³ Hayami, "Japanese American Relocation Digital Archive."

⁸⁴ "Statement and Testimony of Dillon S. Myer," 8-10.

⁸⁵ "Statement and Testimony of Dillon S. Myer," 19.

⁸⁶ Daniels, "Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective," 303.

This tension crystallized with the juxtaposition of Harry Ueno and Fred Tayama. Starting with the filling of block leader positions with Nisei, to eventually handing over all positions of self-government to them as well, the Issei protested and asserted their stance as being the community's natural leaders. And despite the numerous other elements that may have fueled the revolt of Manzanar, the intergenerational conflict, magnified by close containment during evacuation, exploded on the community with devastating results.

Primary Sources:

California State University. “Japanese American World War II Evacuation Oral History Project.” <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/texts>.

In the Japanese American Project of the Oral History Program at California State University, Fullerton numerous interviews with internees were conducted in the five decades following the internment process. Conducted by various interviewers and interviewees, six were utilized for this study that illuminated the diverse internee experience within Manzanar. The Oral History Program is an integral source for interviews conducted with hundreds of internees from all camps, with many different experiences.

Densho: The Japanese American Legacy Project. “Sites of Shame: Exploring Japanese American Incarceration.” <http://www.densho.org>.

The Japanese American Legacy Project was another archive providing numerous firsthand accounts of internees. However, this source was used more for diary entries, personal correspondences, and personnel memos, rather than interviews alone.

Museum of the City of San Francisco. “Chronology of San Francisco War Events.” <http://www.sfmuseum/1906/ww2.html>.

The Museum of the City of San Francisco offered numerous sources detailing the events and experiences of Japanese Americans before and after internment. Focusing exclusively on sources from San Francisco, the information was limited but revelatory nonetheless. This source was best used for its abundance of Japanese American newspaper articles published before and during their internment and its collection of government documentation pertaining to the events of Manzanar and other camps.

The Online Archive of California. “Japanese American Relocation Digital Archive.” <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/texts>.

The “Japanese American Relocation Digital Archive” is, among other things, a comprehensive source of the personal accounts of Japanese American internees. This source was best utilized for its collection of diary entries and oral histories from internees of the Manzanar camp.

Truman Presidential Museum and Library. “The War Relocation Authority and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during WWII.” <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/library.htm>.

The Truman Presidential Museum and Library's "The War Relocation Authority and the Incarceration of Japanese Americans during WWII" is a collection of the WRA's documentation of the events that caused Japanese American internment and the legislation that authorized it. It also offers various government documents, ranging from evacuation fliers to congressional hearings.

Secondary Sources:

Azuma, Eiichiro. *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Azuma's transnational study was best used when examining the economic participation of the Japanese Americans and how that influenced the relationship between them and their white neighbors. Using newspaper articles and economic periodicals alongside oral histories, Azuma links the economic tensions with social prejudice.

Broom, Leonard and John I. Kitsuse. *The Managed Casualty: The Japanese American Family in World War II*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.

This work was utilized when it examined the administrative policies enacted by the United States' federal government in the internment of Japanese Americans and deconstructed each document in searching for the roots of the oppressive legislation.

Broom, Leonard and Ruth Riemer. *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese-Americans*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Broom and Riemer's work is another source studying the economic role played by the Japanese Americans during the early twentieth century. However, this book also focused on the sociological instigators that provoked internment.

Daniels, Roger. *Concentration Camps: North America*. Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1989.

Relying on primary materials from the Washington National Archives, Daniels gives a thorough and detailed overview of the internment process.

Daniels, Roger. "Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective." *The History Teacher* 35 (2002): 297-310

In Daniels' publication in the *History Teacher*, he breaks from his typical outlining of the events to offer a psychological and sociological approach to understanding the consequences of the internment. Using a "before and after" method of looking at the events, he argues that the internment of many Issei discouraged their further participation in American society and that the majority of Nisei too, became disillusioned.

Daniels, Roger. *The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans*. Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1975.

In this piece, Daniels relies mainly on government documentation in outlining the causes, justifications, and legalization of Japanese American internment. Punctuated with introductions and prefaces by the author, the whole book is mainly the publication of numerous government officials' correspondence, legislation, and memos illustrating the decision to relocate the Japanese Americans.

Daniels, Roger, Sandra C. Taylor, and Harry H.L. Kitano, eds. *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.

This work is not only a brief overview of the Japanese American relocation process, but also a collection of thirty journal publications of actual internees and camp employees discussing their experiences.

Fiset, Louis. *Imprisoned Apart: The World War II Correspondence of an Issei Couple*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

In this book, Fiset organized the correspondences of the Matsushitas, a Japanese American couple separated during the internment process. Offering the personal accounts of two individuals from inside the camps, the author uses a human experience in illustrating the unnecessary and cruel policies that separated the couple.

Hane, Mikiso. "Wartime Internment." *The Journal of American History* 77 (1990): 569-575.

Hane's journal article is a brief synopsis of the Japanese American internment period. He gives a general outline of the events leading up to and following the events.

Hirabayashi, Lane R. *The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1999.

This work is the collection of the late Dr. Tamie Tsuchiyama's fieldnotes, data, reports, and letters all having to do with her research in the internment camp of Poston,

Arizona. Arranged and forwarded by the author, each piece conveys the brilliant doctor's experiences and opinions.

Kurashige, Lon. "Resistance, Collaboration, and Manzanar Protest." *The Pacific Historical Review* 70 (2001): 387-417.

Lon Kurashige's article was imperative in understanding the events of the Manzanar revolt. This work details the events and causes of the riot, offering a critical examination of the Manzanar administration's involvement in its origins.

Maki, Mitchell T., Harry H.L. Kitano, and Megan S. Berthold. *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

This book largely examines the aftermath of the Japanese American internment. Using political documentation and the judicial approaches that some internees used in fighting against internment, the work illustrates the economic and social impact of relocation on this group.

Nagata, Donna K. *Legacy of Injustice: Exploring the Cross-Generational Impact of the Japanese American Internment*. New York: Plenum Press, 1993.

Nagata's work is one of the few that actually investigates the generational differences among interned Japanese Americans. Using a psychological approach in studying the demographic group, she argues that the deconstruction of familial structure was a major contributor to internee dissatisfaction.

Nishimoto, Richard S. and ed., Lane Ryo Hirabayashi. *Inside an American Concentration Camp: Japanese American Resistance at Poston, Arizona*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1995.

This book covers the events that took place within the internment camp of Poston. This work was crucial in understanding Manzanar, as Poston was another camp that experienced a mass riot. Used as a contrast, this work illustrated the common threads of injustice protested against by internees.

Rabbit in the Moon, Directed by Emiko Omori, 85 minutes, New Day Films, 1999, videocassette and 16mm.

Emiko Omori's *Rabbit in the Moon* is an insightful documentary covering the many elements involved in the Poston riot. Most importantly, it films live interviews with former internees. This information was best used in the discussion involving the J.A.C.L., generational differences, and the drafting of interned Japanese Americans.

Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. *Personal Justice Denied*. Washington, D.C.: The United States Government Printing Office, 1982.

Personal Justice Denied was a critical work, detailing the government's decision to relocate Japanese Americans. This is considered a secondary source but uses little more than the actual government documents used to justify and carry out the evacuation through resettlement.

Taylor, Sandra C. *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Taylor's book is a case study of the Japanese American internment at Topaz. This, again, was a good source to use as a contrast to the Manzanar incident, but also as a work broadening the understanding of the individual within concentration.

Unrau, Harlan D. *The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry During World War II: A Historical Study of the Manzanar War Relocation Center*. Manzanar: United States Department of the Interior, 1996.

The most important secondary source used was Unrau's *The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry During World War II*. Appointed the task of combining scholarly work and primary sources into a case study by the United States Department of the Interior, Unrau offered a detailed account of what happened during the Manzanar revolt. Not only this, but his work offers the opinions of some of the highest regarded scholars on the subject as to why the riot took place.

Yanagisako, Sylvia Junko. *Transforming the Past: Tradition and Kinship Among Japanese Americans*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985.

Yanagisako's book offered a great deal of background information on traditional Japanese familial structures and differences in, and before moving to America. Although she never goes into the internment experience, she provided pre-internment information that applies directly to the tensions created within Manzanar.