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The Black Press: Reporting of Racial Incidents During World War II

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The Black Press: Reporting of Racial Incidents in the Military During World War II

In the summer of 1941 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, African-American Private Ned Turman and other black soldiers created a disturbance to protest an overcrowded segregated bus. Although the black soldiers requested that African-American military police be summoned, the bus driver called local white police. Turman scuffled with Elwyn L. Hargrove, a white military policeman, and took possession of Hargrove's firearm. Just before killing Hargrove and wounding two other white officers, Turman reportedly yelled, "God damn it! I'm goin' to break you MP's beating us colored soldiers!"¹ Turman was shot dead by another white officer, Sgt. Russell Owens, who entered from the rear of the bus. But the story of Turman's shooting is scarcely half the record of the full "Night of Terror" which the military police staged afterwards. According to the *Pittsburgh Courier*, a black newspaper, "Colored soldiers by the hundreds were rudely rounded up at gun point throughout the Fayetteville area, packed in trucks, and hustled off to camp without explanation."² They were thrown into the guardhouse, abused, beaten, and robbed. White military police were neither questioned nor interrogated about the incident, and Turman's killer was acquitted.

On August 21, 1941, the *Pittsburgh Courier* published reactions to the murder of Private Ned Turman and the "Night of Terror" that followed in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The majority of local black citizens felt that it was military and social conditions which were the underlying causes for these disturbances. They believed that the military now had fewer opportunities and lacked adequate facilities for black soldiers than during World War I.

¹ P. L. Prattis, "The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services of the United States," *The Journal of Negro Education* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 355.

² "Fort Bragg's 'Night of Terror' Described," *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 16, 1941.

During World War II, everyday living had changed in Fayetteville as its population more than tripled because of the stationing of black and white soldiers at Ft. Bragg. Fayetteville officials told the *Pittsburgh Courier* that black soldiers were forced to fraternize in Fayetteville's most troubled spots because of inadequate recreational facilities. Citizens wrote to the *Courier* complaining that African-American soldiers had to contend with the southern white discrimination which did not allow for their fair treatment. The *Courier* described this as "the selection of young, inexperienced white men from southern towns who were given clubs and guns. These men were then placed into African-American areas with no restriction of force to use upon them."³ The *Pittsburgh Courier*, along with many Fayetteville citizens, campaigned for black soldier representation in the military police to patrol the troubled sections in Fayetteville and to handle all problems with black soldiers.⁴

The *Pittsburgh Courier* also published comments from Major McNeer, the Provost Marshal at Fort Bragg, who ordered the arrests and incarceration of black civilians and soldiers during the "Night of Terror." The *Courier* questioned McNeer about the insults and brutal assaults committed on blacks by white military police. McNeer responded that all arrests were made to protect the black soldiers.⁵ *The Charlotte Observer*, a white-run newspaper, stated that the death of Turman and the "Night of Terror" that followed were not race related, but were expected. *The Observer* stated, "This is something that must be expected where you have a large number of soldiers in overcrowded areas and this thing could happen between white soldiers."⁶ After Private Turman's murder and the arrest of over five hundred black soldiers which followed

³ "What Fayetteville Leaders Said About Incidents at Fort Bragg," *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 21, 1941, National Edition.

⁴ "What Fayetteville Leaders Said About Incidents at Fort Bragg."

⁵ "Major McNeer, Provost Marshal at Fort Bragg, Admits Camp is Tough--Fails to Answer Some Pointed Questions," *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 21, 1941, National Edition.

⁶ "What Fayetteville Leaders Said About Incidents at Fort Bragg."

the “Night of Terror, *The Star of Zion*, a North Carolina black newspaper, stated, “We want to know how the administration and the War Department can talk about defending democracy when Negro soldiers get Nazi-like treatment.”⁷ The *Courier* also wrote that “black soldier morale for the war runs high, but a rebellious spirit refuses and vows that it will not further suffer abuses.”⁸ The actions of Ned Turman were viewed by many African-Americans as a protest against the beating of black soldiers. Consequently, Turman was considered a hero to some black soldiers at Fort Bragg.

Local Jim Crow laws, military police, and civilian police were used to protect white communities and to handle any possible social disruptions. The manner of protection by these small white communities became a widely-publicized issue in the black press. These conflicts were not provoked or encouraged by the black press. They were simply isolated local and personal confrontations. The role of the black press was to inform the public of racial mistreatment of African-American soldiers, to reveal the War Department’s handling of these situations, to critique southern undemocratic practices, and to report reactions to conflicts between blacks and local authorities. The reporting by the black press of racial incidents, disturbances, and conflicts in and around military camps, particularly in the South, created controversy, and sometimes animosity, among the various participants involved. These participants included the War Department, the southern local establishment, the military, black soldiers, and civilians. Even the local and national black press were at odds about inflammatory reporting. Nationally-syndicated African-American newspapers discussed segregation and discrimination as a national problem. North Carolina black newspapers sought community involvement in solving these problems.

⁷ “We’re Still Waiting,” *The Star of Zion*, September 18, 1941.

⁸ “What Fayetteville Leaders Said About Incidents at Fort Bragg.”

Blacks experienced inequality and hostility as described in *The Employment of Negro Troops* by Ulysses Lee. He revealed evidence of military opinions that black soldiers were less capable than white soldiers. This view influenced both segregated training and poor military experiences by blacks in the Army in both World Wars. In one of his chapters, “Harvest of Disorder,” and through the use of white military transcripts and the black press reaction, Lee stated that military and social segregation led to the reoccurrence of riots and low soldier morale.

Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the Armed Forces by Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman studied policies regarding the segregated African-American soldier from 1940-1958. The book focused on the War Department pressing for equitable changes within the military, but *Foxholes and Color Lines* concluded that it was the military authorities within camps who acted independently and not necessarily in accordance with what the War Department required. Mershon and Schlossman stated that segregation was a political conflict, and African-Americans were one of several groups that used black moral support of the war to affect policy changes against black military discrimination.⁹

Mary Motley’s, *The Invisible Soldier*, and Maggi Morehouse’s, *Fighting in the Jim Crow Army*, both focused on the relocation of some African-Americans into Jim-Crow sections in the South. These two books gave a more personal history of black soldiers in World War II. Both books focused on discrimination and segregation encountered within and outside the army.

Research regarding the black press during World War II focused on the reporting of African-Americans in the military and its impact on the entire society. Among those scholars concerned with the black press during World War II, was author Maxwell R. Brooks. Dr. Brooks chose to highlight the importance of increased newspaper distribution among the

⁹ Sherrie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), Introduction.

African-American population since the black press was most effective in their manner of protest. Dr. Brooks stated that “because protest was of chief importance by black papers, most students study this characteristic.”¹⁰ Brooks used several forms of quantitative methodologies to gather most of his evidence from newspapers he labeled as making up the “National Black Press.” Each newspaper was published in local and national editions.¹¹ Brooks concluded “that it may be recalled that this inquiry was undertaken in order to examine more closely a certain kind of thinking regarding Negro newspapers, specifically to examine the view that they were radical, subversive, and communistic...the hypothesis underlying the investigation was that they were indigenous in their orientation, rather than alien to the American tradition.”¹² His conclusion studied issues like discrimination, segregation, and riots and their frequency of appearance in black newspapers.

Another author, Lee Finkle, also used the method of gathering numerical data to emphasize the establishment of the black press when writing about African-American soldiers. In his work, *Forum for Protest*, Finkle discussed the redistribution of African-Americans into urban areas and suggested that the reading of newspapers increased their circulation to over six million.¹³ Finkle stated that segregation came to be accepted in both World Wars. He used newspapers, such as *The Crisis*, which suggested that segregation was a “condition and not a theory.” By upholding segregation, *The Crisis* faced some black public ridicule, but Finkle defended *The Crisis*’ efforts as “taking advantage of the disadvantages.”¹⁴ As for reflections and accusations that the black press was seen as inflammatory during World War II, Finkle suggested

¹⁰ Maxwell R. Brooks, PhD., *The Negro Press Re-Examined: Political Content of Leading Negro Newspapers* (Boston, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1959), 12.

¹¹ Brooks, 38-40.

¹² Brooks, 57.

¹³ Lee Finkle, *Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), 53-55.

¹⁴ Finkle, 40-41.

that it was the northern press such as *The Chicago Defender*, *The Crisis*, and the *Pittsburgh Courier* that influenced the southern press from a stance of gradual social change into a more militant position of race relations.¹⁵ Another source using the quantitative method to measure the pervasiveness of black press reporting information to urban African-American communities was *Democracy Betrayed*. Author Timothy B. Tyson's essay, "Wars for Democracy," in *Democracy Betrayed* presented the significance of enrollment numbers in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Tyson proposed that during the 1940's, the NAACP grew by 900 percent, and it was this growth that "was used to place the NAACP and its program on the lips of all the people, the uncouth masses included."¹⁶ "Wars for Democracy" alerted the black population to the discrimination faced by black soldiers and to the nation's mistreatment of some of its people.¹⁷

A Question of Sedition by Patrick S. Washburn was written as the result of a meeting between the U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. They discussed the possibility of bringing sedition charges against the black press during World War II. The author relied on oral interviews with black publishers such as John H. Sengtake of *The Chicago Defender* to obtain information for his book. The book was written in response to *Forum for a Protest* which according to Washburn was geared more toward newspaper context and editorials than to highlight charges of sedition against black periodicals.¹⁸ *A Question for Sedition* also cited Attorney General Francis Biddle for preventing a number of black publishers

¹⁵ Finkle, 64-65.

¹⁶ David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson, *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 256-257.

¹⁷ Finkle, 115.

¹⁸ Patrick S. Washburn, *A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 7.

from being indicted for sedition. There was not enough evidence for the United States government to ban or act against black newspapers.¹⁹

In the development of a segregated military plan, the Armed Forces decided to enlist African-Americans based on a ten percent make-up of blacks relative to the total population of the United States. This ten percent quota would then be evenly distributed to all branches of the military.²⁰ Though the African-American soldiers would be isolated, they would have the opportunity to enter and expand their contributions to the war effort. In “Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II” in the *Journal of Negro History*, George Q. Flynn explained that in the 1940’s America still maintained a doctrine of equality, meaning a separate black and white society with equal opportunity for all.²¹ Although the quota proposed equal entry into certain branches of the military based on population, African-Americans were still victims of discrimination relative to their placement in the fighting forces.²² Segregation of African-American soldiers during World War II was a continuation of the policy set by the War Department during World War I. This policy separated them from white soldiers and white communities and was based on confirmed and unconfirmed reports that their inherent biological and mental deficiencies contributed to possible cowardice on the battlefield and the inability to achieve military readiness.²³ Because of this discrimination and segregation, the ten percent quota that the War Department ordered for all military branches was never achieved.

During World War I, the War Department’s policies called for the confinement of black soldiers in separate garrisons and their utilization as service laborers. World War II and the

¹⁹ Washburn, 10.

²⁰ Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops--The United States Army in World War II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army, 1966), 40-42.

²¹ George Q. Flynn, “Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II,” *Journal of Negro History* 69, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 15.

²² Flynn, “Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II,” 15.

²³ Mershon and Schlossman, 1-2.

newly accepted ten-percent quota plan continued the segregated policies even into newly-created branches of the military. World War II now presented a new threat to this confinement because black outfits would be trained to fight in large units and would be distributed across the South.²⁴ The ten percent quota allowed a limited number of black soldiers to enroll in new ventures, but it maintained the rule of separate training schools. Among these was the Tuskegee Air Force Academy where African-Americans had limited air space for training, and eventually they escorted white bomber pilots into and out of war campaigns. However, the Navy still maintained its stringent practice of assigning blacks to menial roles such as cooks, mess attendants, and personal servants for white officers.²⁵ The Navy also defended its placement of blacks as stewards aboard ships taking advantage of their established social status as servants.²⁶ African-Americans expected equitable entrance into military branches, but segregation and discrimination continued to be an accepted practice by most white military personnel.

Southern communities felt that black military personnel could possibly disrupt the “physical” separation of the two races. To achieve successful mobilization of blacks into the South, the Armed Forces relocated African-American soldiers to remote areas outside of communities and military camps. Also, to dispel fears of armed blacks in and around the white locale, the Army provided training with limited weapons and relied on repeated physical conditioning and the assignment of menial labor tasks. *The Crisis* stated that “The National Association for the Advancement of Color People approved the equitable policies toward black soldiers by the War Department. Black soldiers were now in proportionate numbers in all established branches, peace-time black reserves had been reactivated for duty, and the number of

²⁴ Mershon and Schlossman, 7.

²⁵ Mershon and Schlossman, 9-10.

²⁶ Mershon and Schlossman, 11-12.

black officers had been increased.”²⁷ While the NAACP labeled the advancement for blacks as satisfactory, the Association still maintained that the Army adhered to segregation which prevented any improvements to their everyday life in the military.²⁸ Common reporting in *The Chicago Defender* and *Pittsburgh Courier* also argued that the military aided in the spread of discrimination and segregation as both practices were institutionalized even in some progressive areas of the northern United States.²⁹ African-Americans still found themselves in over-populated camps that lacked adequate facilities. White officers felt embarrassed to train black soldiers, and they requested transfers to white units. Thus, the black soldiers felt abandoned. Most traditional southern officers adapted their racist civilian views toward blacks in army life.³⁰ This resulted in black soldiers retaining the status of an “idle soldier” and being subjected to discriminatory treatment, inadequate training, and no promise of actual placement in combat units during the war.

A secondary purpose of a segregated military was to maintain as much separation as possible between black soldiers and white civilians. Failure to keep these two groups separated caused conflicts. The military provided inadequate social and recreational opportunities for black soldiers. These conditions forced soldiers to frequent black areas with unsanitary conditions and prostitution which affected their behavior upon returning to camp.³¹ In seeking a better experience, the black soldiers then increased their visits to white communities. The military was fully aware that provocations between black military personnel and race-hostile whites could develop, especially considering the social norms of that time. However, the

²⁷ “The Negro In The United States Army,” *The Crisis*, 1941.

²⁸ “The Negro In The United States Army.”

²⁹ W. Y. Bell, Jr., “The Negro Warrior’s Home Front,” *Phylon* 5, no.3. (3rd Qtr., 1944), 274.

³⁰ E. T. Hall, Jr., “Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations in the Army,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 52, no.5 (March, 1947): 401-409. JSTOR, www.jstor.org.

³¹ Bell, “The Negro Warrior’s Home Front,” 273.

military's position was that segregation was justifiable and served equally well for both blacks and whites. The War Department felt it had established fair guidelines for the use of African-American soldiers, but in no manner would it meddle in state and community affairs occurring outside military camps.³²

Social discrimination and segregation of blacks had been a long-established practice in all areas including the military, and the War Department concluded that, politically, any integration of blacks within the military would impact upon public opinion of the Armed Forces. The issue of incorporating blacks to fight and train with white soldiers first had to change within the nation's local communities. To address the emotional responses that called against the integration of black and white soldiers, the Adjutant General of the Department of Army offered the following response "Experiments to meet the wishes and the demands of the champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale, and would result in ultimate defeat. We will not work to alter traditional customs and warn individuals who choose to intervene or second guess decisions of the military."³³ The African-American press reported the acceptance of segregation by the Armed Forces as mistreatment of black soldiers. Segregated soldiers would suffer in these separate but unequal camps. They were not adequately protected from hostile whites. This hands-off approach by the War Department increased the chances of racial incidents between African-American soldiers and white civilians.³⁴

The black press attacked segregation as denying the basic freedoms of American democracy by upholding Nazi-like theories. The black press utilized Axis-like similarities of white supremacy and colonialism against Southern traditions. They argued that much of

³² Lee, 30-31.

³³ Mershon and Schlossman, 21.

³⁴ Mershon and Schlossman, 22.

Germany's racist ideologies were established, particularly and predominantly in the South. The *Pittsburgh Courier* compared the ideologies of military segregation, secondary citizen status, and giving courtesy to whites by African-Americans, as very similar to Hitler's doctrine of white supremacy.³⁵ Charlotte's *The Star of Zion* frequently ran articles borrowed from *The Crisis* that labeled Detroit's police department and their local authorities as "inept and corrupt and have allowed Axis-like activities."³⁶ These similarities, proposed by African-American newspapers, were interpreted differently by southern leaders and some African-Americans.

The black press' critique of southern racism was to raise awareness that American blacks could be the chief speakers against suppression for all minorities throughout the world. The *Courier* was one of the first newspapers that informed African-Americans that even though the United States was a democracy, it also exploited persons of color in the same manner as other nations. Colonialism in Africa, India, and China mandated an improved democracy in the United States, thus minority races abroad would follow the African-American example.³⁷ Newspapers, such as *The Chicago Defender*, criticized the manner in which white police stationed in North Carolina, Arkansas, and Detroit, handled black soldiers and civilians during riots that involved campaigns, housing, and soldier disruptions in white communities. *The Chicago Defender* described the Memphis police in this way: "Where threats and other coercive means of intimidation fail, they resort to the well-known Nazi technique of mass arrests to harass and intimidate members of the black population. There remains only one thing for the police to do to complete the German pattern--that is to huddle their victims into a concentration camp."³⁸ The black press hoped that this type of reporting would raise awareness of these injustices.

³⁵ "Hitlerism at Home," *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 23, 1941, Vol. 34, No. 34.

³⁶ "Detroit Destroys Democracy," *The Star of Zion*, August 14, 1943.

³⁷ "Convinced That World Interests Are Associated," *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 5, 1942.

³⁸ "Memphis Police," *The Chicago Defender*, January 18, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 39.

The black press labeled southern racism as grievances imposed upon the black race during both peace and war times in the United States. Segregation, discrimination and grievances of abuse by the white military became the main discussion that caused deep resentment and low morale among the black soldier populace.³⁹ It was in World War II that the black press adjusted the word grievances to injustices because the unfair treatment of black soldiers was only reported by African-American newspapers.⁴⁰ “African-Americans developed an indifference to the war effort for the simple reason that “African-Americans have lost faith in the justice of white America.”⁴¹ This served two goals, the first was that the reporting of injustice was used to inform the military, government, and black and white races that the press was raising black morale in the war. The second was to bring attention to the problematic handling of black soldiers and civilians by local and military white police.

African-Americans were already convinced that the South acted through terror and open violence toward black soldiers and civilians. The black press proposed that it was government establishments, such as the War Department, who accommodated southern violence by punishing African-Americans through dishonorable discharges and prison time for military disruptions. *The Chicago Defender* cautioned the War Department that their biased military trials and lack of investigations into riots outside of military camps were endangering African-American soldiers and public morale and support for the war.⁴² *The Defender* provided an unresponsive War Department with a warning that black civilians were forced to consider taking justice at their own discretion. In doing so, the paper warned that African-American behavior

³⁹ “Blood Shed Could Have Been Avoided,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 18, 1941.

⁴⁰ Finkle, 114

⁴¹ Roy Wilkins, “We Are Accused of Inciting to Riot and Being Traitors,” *The Crisis*, June, 1942.

⁴² Race Awaits Results of Investigations: Civilian and Military Police on Guard in Little Rock,” *The Chicago Defender*, March 28, 1942, Vol. 38, No. 49.

could become more unpredictable and a hazard to both races.⁴³ The War Department as well as white newspapers could no longer keep secret the violence on African-American soldiers. It was black periodicals like the *Defender* and *Pittsburgh Courier* that insured news about riots was spread quickly into communities.

As news spread, black soldiers often retreated to their camps to secure weapons for their own protection.⁴⁴ Individual protection was defended in many letters. As one soldier wrote, “we are living under a keg of dynamite...something needs to be done about it...I protest because I am in the middle of everything.”⁴⁵ The press argued that escalations outside of the military camps occurred because of the lack of intervention by both government and military authorities.

Black press reports indicated that military white police merely stood by and even participated when local law enforcers provoked self-defense responses by black soldiers. These military police failed to maintain order in overcrowded buses or civilian communities. Blacks accused southern white military police of protecting their own race and acting against their patriotic duty to protect black military personnel.⁴⁶ By proposing that it was white authorities who allowed these military/civilian conflicts, the black press was viewed as agitators of civil unrest even by some southern black groups. Ella Baker, Assistant Field Secretary of the NAACP, concluded that “most southern branches of the NAACP were social groups that did not approve of radical tactics, direct confrontations, or any collective action in attacking segregation and its Jim Crow laws.”⁴⁷

⁴³ “Race Awaits Results of Investigations.”

⁴⁴ “Avert Riot over Ft. Sill Cop Attack, *The Chicago Defender*, August 8, 1942, No. 54.

⁴⁵ “A Soldier Writes: Sees Trouble Ahead for Boys At Fort Sill-Unbearable Discrimination Has Produced Militant Spirit,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 30, 1941, Vol. 32, No. 35.

⁴⁶ Bell, “The Negro Warrior’s Home Front,” 271.

⁴⁷ Harvard Sitkoff, *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II On The American South: African-American Militancy in The World War II South, Another Perspective* (University Press of Mississippi/Jackson, 1997), 77.

Southern society viewed the arming of black soldiers under the command of white officers as an acceptable practice. Therefore, if blacks were well contained within their own confines, this would produce the desired “good-southern Negro.” The South’s attitude toward black soldiers became a problem when outside forces or northern agitators posed a threat to black soldier conduct and the compliance with segregation laws concerning busing and white-only establishments. Southern whites believed that agitation from the press and northern black soldiers disrupted the conduct of black soldiers and instigated conflicts within and outside of the military. To some southerners such a man was dangerous and must be made to “know his place” with violence and terror if necessary.⁴⁸ These incidents were attributed by the black press to southern Jim Crow laws, segregation laws, and civilian and white police conduct.

Critics of black newspapers maintained that these conflicts developed due to African-American responses to highly-embellished incendiary articles published in the national and local black press. The southern majority also considered that northern African-Americans disrupted the ideal conduct of “good southern Negroes,” and under such an influence, each challenged social customs and traditions enforced outside of the Army.⁴⁹ In opposition to this view, P.L. Prattis of the *Pittsburgh Courier* defended northern black soldiers, stating “these young men are strangers to southern forms of discrimination. It is this segregation and discrimination that has forced personal problems between both whites and blacks to take precedence over the war.”⁵⁰ In addition, *The Chicago Defender* proposed that attacks on northern black soldiers mainly came from local white police and civilians who objected to this type of soldier in their communities. “Inasmuch as we are members of the northern Army, we will have to return North. The Negro

⁴⁸ Roi Ottley, “Seething with Resentment – Negro Morale,” *The New Republic* (November 10, 1941): 6.

⁴⁹ Mershon and Schlossman, 9.

⁵⁰ Prattis, 355.

soldiers of the South are ordered not to have anything to do with us.”⁵¹ *The Defender* offered this observation by some Michigan black soldiers who concluded that their attacks precipitated southern discontent for northern soldiers and the local laws which enforced the physical separation of southern and northern African-American soldiers.

The Defender published several responses from northern African-Americans who planned to take action on their own behalf against those opposed to their presence. Michigan soldiers, who were relocated to another military camp after white civilians fired at them in Arkansas, asserted, “These hillbillies hate northern Negroes, and southern Negroes are given no trouble at all. Us northern boys are victims of an age old hatred, give us real ammunition and we will run every...out of this state (Arkansas).”⁵² It was suggested by Southern community leaders that “Northern Negroes” be relocated to northern military camps. This suggestion was then challenged by the black press that if the War Department gave in to the southern demands, then “not only would they condone violence and discrimination, but calling black troops out of the South would be legitimizing segregation.”⁵³

Southern white liberals, along with conservatives dealing with race relations, agreed with the military’s slow and evolutionary change of black soldier status in the military. Southern branches of the NAACP insisted that only northern African-American newspapers and “northern agitators” incited riots and violence unnecessarily. Southern papers, such as *The Savannah Tribune*, called on southern black newspapers not to reprint northern editorials and to maintain the fight for economic advancements rather than presenting a danger to the white majority.⁵⁴

⁵¹ “Soldier’s Letters Paint Dark Picture of Army ‘Democracy,’” *The Chicago Defender*, July 19, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 13.

⁵² “Soldiers Give Version of Slugging Unarmed Troopers in Arkansas,” *The Chicago Defender*, August 23, 1941, Vol. 37, No. 18.

⁵³ Finkle, 166-167.

⁵⁴ Sitkoff, 78.

White southern moderate Virginius Dabney, editor of the Richmond, VA, *Times Dispatch*, feared that frequent reporting by the black press of black soldier and white military police clashes was used to take advantage of the issue of hostile feelings between southern Negro-phobes and “northern white agitators.” Dabney labeled *The Crisis* and the nationally-syndicated newspaper, *Pittsburgh Courier*, as major “northern agitators.” He asserted that not only *The Crisis*, but also the *Pittsburgh Courier*, used civilian police and black soldier altercations “to stir Negro citizens, and particularly Negro soldiers, to demand the complete wiping out of all racial differentiation overnight.”⁵⁵ Categorizing the black press as “northern agitators,” Dabney urged southern African-Americans not “to push too fast for changes and abjure the tactics of radicals from the North.”⁵⁶ Dabney wanted a slow, gradual transition in race relations to take place. He felt that the agitation by the black press would contribute to more violence and would hamper any present or future civil rights advancement.

A factor that declared the black press as a disturbance to the sensitive relationship between southern communities and well-behaved black soldiers included sensationalistic coverage. This coverage created favorable conditions for the possibility of riots to occur and for unchecked rumors of violence to be spread among black and white soldiers. On July 25, 1942, *The Carolina Times* was quick to respond to a rumor at Fort Dix, New Jersey, concerning the shooting of Negro soldiers, who upon exiting a segregated pool, were machine-gunned by whites. *The Carolina Times* alerted its readers that the situation had been investigated by the NAACP. After another investigation of the situation by a civilian aide to the Secretary of War, William H. Hastie concluded that “there had been no shooting, rioting, or incident as so

⁵⁵ “We Are Accused of Inciting to Riot.”

⁵⁶ Finkle, 63.

described. Furthermore, that a rumor of this nature can be extremely damaging.”⁵⁷ There were also stories in which some facts were concrete, but other dangerous elements had been added to fuel more violent responses. However, in some incidents, the black press was quick to clarify and condemn these rumors.

“Not Confined to Race,” an article written by *The Carolina Times*, pointed out the case of a white man severely beaten by a mob of African-Americans because he supposedly sodomized a thirteen-year-old black youth. Later investigation by *The Carolina Times* found that the white man assaulted the youth but did not sodomize him, and the paper condemned black civilians who decided to take justice into their own hands. *The Carolina Times* urged that courts must settle this matter rather than leaving it to “a bunch of idiots who are too full of hatred to listen to reason.”⁵⁸ Further exploration of this article revealed that, within North Carolina, coverage of violence by the black press was handled in a fashion that agreed with the ideals of the United States and encouraged equality and democratic principles. It recognized the unfair treatment of African-Americans nationally, yet within its local bounds, it aimed at punishing both white and blacks equally to curb racial violence.

The Carolina Times did not attribute violence to the military or to black or white individuals. The newspaper took a firm stance that riots were “mob violence and a crime that could not be confined to any special race or group.”⁵⁹ The newspaper objectively referenced crimes perpetrated by both races. For example, when *The Carolina Times* reported that black hoodlums assaulted a white man for allegedly molesting an African-American youth, it commented “that they and not the law punished a white man because he had committed a crime

⁵⁷ “Rumor ‘Absolutely False’ on Riot at Fort Bragg Recently,” *The Carolina Times*, July 25, 1942.

⁵⁸ “Not Confined to Race,” *The Carolina Times*, October 24, 1942, Vol. 33, No. 42.

⁵⁹ “The Mob Spirit in Durham,” *The Carolina Times*, December 19, 1942, Vol. 33, No. 51.

against their own.”⁶⁰ The newspaper also blamed Carolina’s inner city courts for failing to provide justice towards those individuals involved in riots. The sentiment was captured by the newspaper as the “court system has forced irresponsible individuals to act on real or imaginary wrongs dealt to them.”⁶¹ *The Carolina Times* clearly differentiated itself in tone and identification of addressing individuals and conditions that fostered military riots. They consistently referred to participants in riots as hoodlums or individuals rather than identifying them as black or white. Riots occurred in communities which were labeled as economically poor, overcrowded, and riddled with crime. Whether consciously done or not, it aimed to set an example much like that proposed by the War Department that local authorities must deal with social plagues within their own boundaries.

In informing black readers of socially-hostile conditions in the South between white police and black soldiers, *The Chicago Defender* published an article about the murder of a young black private, Ellis Reid, a member of the Seventy-Seventh Coast Artillery stationed at Fort Bragg, NC. Reid was shot in the back by Clayton Britt, 17, the white son of a former Fayetteville chief of police. *The Defender* mentioned the inexperience of Britt and questioned his observations that Reid was “drunk and doped” at the time of the shooting.⁶² Britt was not pleased that Reid was a friend of his mother and sister and became uncomfortable with this relationship. Britt was also motivated by a long-time vendetta against African-Americans whom he deemed as “a hoodlum race that had tried to gun down his father in the streets of Fayetteville.” In attributing the shooting to problems between black soldiers outside white communities, *The Defender* interviewed Reid’s father who provided letters written by his son

⁶⁰ “Not Confined to Race.”

⁶¹ “The Mob Spirit in Durham.”

⁶² “Uncover New Evidence in Investigation,” *The Chicago Defender*, March 22, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 48.

that “often spoke of the discrimination he encountered in Fayetteville and of the unfriendly attitude of white residents in the city.”⁶³

The *Defender*'s coverage of Ellis Reid's death is not only a referendum on local police conduct, but it also mentions the absence of official military involvement in the early investigation of this case. *The Defender* addressed the inadequate role that the War Department played in investigating such incidents. The newspaper commented that military authorities kept the circumstances of Reid's death a secret, even to the slain soldier's father. Furthermore, it was only when the New York branch of the NAACP got involved that Clayton's Britt's bond was raised to \$500 for another grand jury investigation in the following month.⁶⁴

The racial situation in North Carolina would not be ignored by *The Chicago Defender* in its coverage of another incident involving a black soldier and a local civilian policeman. The newspaper articles were used to emphasize the established feeling of racial superiority by white military police. A Fort Bragg soldier, Private Harold Daniels, had been “blackjacked” so badly that even the local white newspaper described the event as “of national importance, and it would be harder to find in America anywhere a sadder, more serious event than that here on Saturday in which a New Jersey Negro private soldier was so badly blackjacked by a Raleigh policeman that the Raleigh police themselves felt it necessary to take him to the hospital.”⁶⁵ Interviews with white civilians about the beating also drew sympathetic responses that “it was just because his skin was black. . . Upon recovery will this soldier be a fit defender of a nation whose apparent patriotism is obscured by the color of her soldier's skin.”⁶⁶ These acts of violence shared some

⁶³ “Uncover New Evidence in Investigation.”

⁶⁴ “Uncover New Evidence in Investigation.”

⁶⁵ “Dismissal of Cop who Beat Soldier Asked: Whites Join Criticism of Brutality in Raleigh, NC,” *The Chicago Defender*, April 19, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 52.

⁶⁶ Prattis, 355.

concerns that incidents of this nature impacted soldier morale as well as African-American civilian support for the war.

The article also served the purpose of preventing cover up by white racist police against black soldiers. To substantiate that this attack on Daniels was racially motivated, *The Chicago Defender* used strong evidence such as white crowds urging police to “hit the nigger.” Official police reports concluded that Daniels had suffered major abrasions, but that police conduct was not responsible for his injuries.⁶⁷ *The Defender* also acknowledged that black soldiers like Daniels were victims of white police brutality and mistreatment when facing the courts. The newspaper pointed out that upon his recovery Daniels was charged with disorderly conduct and assault upon an officer.

In addressing how African-Americans would handle the deployment of Negro policemen to diffuse the tension between white policemen and African-American civilians as well as black soldiers, *The Carolina Times* advocated experimentation. In its editorial, “Negro Policemen,” the newspaper admitted that there was a problem with delinquent “hoodlums” present in Charlotte and Hayti, a district of Durham, North Carolina. While proposing black military police experimentation in Hayti, *The Carolina Times* raised concern that none would take place because it regarded Hayti’s city officials as “dumb and stagnant and continue to cling to the theory that Negro policemen for Durham would violate the holy of holiest of southern traditions.”⁶⁸ Crime had decreased in Charlotte and not only had blacks benefited, but the experimentation with black police had met the approval of a majority of Charlotte white citizens.⁶⁹

The use of Negro military police came to prominence, once again, when *The Carolina Times* covered a riot in the Hayti section of Durham. Information was that the riot stemmed

⁶⁷ Prattis, 355.

⁶⁸ “Negro Policemen,” *The Carolina Times*, August 8, 1942, Vol. 13, No. 37.

⁶⁹ “Negro Policemen.”

from a white ABC (Alcohol and Beverage Control Committee) police officer, T.L. Bailey, assaulting a black soldier over his use of liquor rations. Eventually Bailey was threatened by a mob of African-American soldiers. This incident spread into further assaults throughout the city and “black military police and white military police from Camp Butner acted with speed and cooperation to prevent further escalation.”⁷⁰ While *The Carolina Times* reported what could have been possible with black and white police working together, another article in the paper was critical of local authorities and their handling of the situation. “Many think the whole affair would never have occurred if local authorities had the foresight to station Negro policemen in the Hayti section.”⁷¹ Subsequent articles introduced other elements about the riot. For instance, when *The Carolina Times* interviewed the pastor of St. Joseph AME Church, he challenged rumors of a knife-wielding soldier who was struck by Officer T.L. Bailey. The pastor made reference to the mentality shared by white policemen like T.L. Bailey. “Their methods reveal a lack of both courtesy and common sense. In a liquor store in a Negro section where hundreds of soldiers were gathered in and around, he might have known that they would resent any semblance of brutality or intimidation on the part of a civilian police, whose duties are restricted to civilians, not soldiers.”⁷² The newspaper identified the ABC squad as a small group of hot-tempered officers who encouraged community disturbances rather than prevention.⁷³ The paper argued that not enough investigation was done by Durham’s ABC concerning the hiring of police to enforce alcohol rationing. *The Carolina Times*, through its articles, encouraged the placement of a small number of black police personnel in Hayti’s community. This was to ensure African-

⁷⁰ “Police Use Tear Gas to Rescue Officer from Angered Soldiers,” *The Carolina Times*, April 10, 1943, Vol. 23, No. 15.

⁷¹ “Police Use Tear Gas to Rescue Officer From Angered Soldiers.”

⁷² “Pastor of St. Joseph AME Church Gives Views of Rioting in Hayti Section of Durham Last Saturday: An open letter on the Disturbance in Durham, NC, Saturday Afternoon April 3, 1943,” *The Carolina Times*, April 10, 1943, Vol. 23, No. 14.

⁷³ “Why the Investigation,” *The Carolina Times*, May 22, 1943.

American as well as whites that within Hayti's jurisdiction the press was working for public protection and a fair manner of handling victims and participants that resulted from civilian riots.

The Carolina Times proposed that black military police officers would better understand members of their own race and help diffuse social tensions before they got out of hand. On June 27, 1943, *The Times* presented its own survey on the question of employment of black policemen. The survey was a collective civilian response, and it pressed "local authorities to stop the national problem of black soldier mistreatment at the hands of white civilian or military police and the consequent riots which followed."⁷⁴ Although there was support for the utilization of African-American military police by some blacks and whites, the implementation of black military police suffered from limits in numbers and lack of equipment or authority. Black military police were often handed weapons without bullets and sometimes just nightsticks. There was no formal recognition that certain black soldiers were military police because of the lack of weapons and uniforms. Black military police enforced limited authority on its own black soldiers but suffered credibility due to white military police involvement. White military police were involved in arrests made by black military police. If white officers beat a soldier, it was often black military police who were viewed with discontent because of their inability to retain prisoners and insure their safe return to proper authorities.⁷⁵ This often caused African-American soldiers to make a mockery of their own as well as white military police.⁷⁶

White superiority was to be a continuance of the norm, and if need be, was reinforced with violence. This was the prevailing social condition not just confined to some of the South

⁷⁴ Clifford Jenkins, "Carolina Times Reader Speaks: Question: Do you think the employment of Negro policemen in Durham would lessen crime rate?," *The Carolina Times*, June 27, 1943, Vol. 23.

⁷⁵ "The Negro Warrior's Home Front," 271

⁷⁶ Lee, 49.

but throughout the United States.⁷⁷ What all of these incidents had in common was that they happened locally, were isolated, and had been precipitated by whites' sense of racial superiority over a black minority. Lee's *Employment of Negro Troops* best captured the situation for African-Americans concerning the military during World War II. "The War Department had established their own role and guidelines for blacks. The War Department administers the laws affecting the military establishment; it cannot act outside the law, nor contrary to the will of the majority of the citizens of the Nation."⁷⁸ African-American newspapers frequently appealed to both government agencies and the War Department for more protection for its black soldiers. African-American press reports, which called for military intervention outside camps as well as within communities, became less frequent. The norm was to print domestic reports of persecuted black soldiers by southern white military police and civilian police.

The dissemination of information by the black press was interpreted by some as subversive and inflammatory. From the analysis presented, it can be concluded that nationally-distributed newspapers, such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *The Chicago Defender*, provided militant responses to the social discrimination faced by black soldiers. As stated, both newspapers reported cases of violence as isolated and outside military camps. Problems were between black soldiers, military, and local white police. The African-American press avoided making discrimination an explicit problem of the nation by focusing their reporting mainly on the military. Local newspapers in North Carolina did not follow the militant language of nationally-syndicated black newspapers. Rather, black periodicals, such as *The Carolina Times*, and *The Star of Zion*, appealed to individuals within their communities to abstain from rioting. This was done through repeated warnings that both whites and blacks, who took matters into

⁷⁷ Mershon and Schlossman, 79.

⁷⁸ Lee, 49.

their own hands, contributed to more ill feelings between both races, increasing the chance of riots. Local papers collaborated with national newspapers and warned all riot participants that when possible, authorities would see them punished. North Carolina newspapers proposed the establishment of a black military police force serving as would-be protectors for the whole community. This moderate stance differed from the national press who advocated that black military police be granted equal authority when working side-by-side with white military police.

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Bell, Jr., W.Y. "The Negro Warrior's Home Front." *Phylon* 5, no. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1944): 271-274.

W.Y. Bell, Jr., wrote that segregation and discrimination produced conditions that bystanders, during riots, must address to understand black soldier militancy. He listed material conditions such as poor military facilities and unsanitary conditions outside of camps that are affected black behavior. Bell proposed that local communities were not granted enough aid to develop recreational facilities to accommodate African-Americans. His final observation was that since the military adopted segregated facilities for soldiers, it would only serve the purpose of crippling a united war effort.

The Carolina Times, July 1942-June 1943. Accessed through Inter-library Loan to University of North Carolina at Asheville from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Microfilm C071 C29t1

This primary source was printed in Durham, North Carolina, and showed how local papers reacted to the African-American military situation. This newspaper differed from nationally-syndicated papers such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *The Chicago Defender* in its manner of writing and who was to blame for racial riots and other social disturbances. *The Carolina Times* reported that all occurrences of racial mistreatment between blacks and whites were not attributed to one specific race. The newspaper was useful in depicting the cover up of race-oriented incidents and how rumors of violence against blacks or whites disrupted a community. The material from this primary source pertained to its proposed experimentation of black military police in black sections of Charlotte and Durham. It provided material from the *Pittsburgh Courier* and their 1941 coverage of frequent white police brutality. The newspaper also showed how instrumental black military police were during a riot on April 10, 1943, between a mob of black soldiers and local white civilian police officers in the Hayti section of Durham.

Jenkins, Clifford, "Carolina Times Reader Speaks: Question: Do you think the employment of Negro policemen in Durham would lessen crime rate?" *The Carolina Times*, June 27, 1943, 23.

"Negro Policemen," *The Carolina Times*, August 8, 1942, Vol. 13, No. 37.

"Not Confined to Race," *The Carolina Times*, October 24, 1942, Vol. 33, No. 42.

“Pastor of St. Joseph AME Church Gives Views of Rioting in Hayti Section of Durham, last Saturday: An open letter on the Disturbance in Durham, NC, Saturday Afternoon April 3, 1943,” *The Carolina Times*, April 10, 1943, Vol. 23, No.14.

“Police Use Tear Gas to Rescue Officer from Angered Soldiers,” *The Carolina Times*, April 10, 1943, Vol. 23, No.15.

“Rumor ‘Absolutely False’ on Riot at Fort Bragg Recently,” *The Carolina Times*, July 25, 1942, Vol. 1, Durham, North Carolina.

“The Mob Spirit in Durham,” *The Carolina Times*, December 19, 1942, Vol. 33, No. 51.

“Why the Investigation,” *The Carolina Times*, May 22, 1943.

The Chicago Defender, January 1, 1941-March 1942. Accessed through Inter-library loan to University of North Carolina At Asheville from Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. Microfilm

The Chicago Defender along with the *Pittsburgh Courier* has been described in history as the most militant of the nationally-syndicated papers during World War II. *The Defender's* political propaganda during World War II was similar to that of *The Crisis*. It was very descriptive in what it called German-inspired methods regarding the treatment of blacks by white military and local police. A 1941 reporter covering the death of a black soldier in Fayetteville, North Carolina, found newspaper accusations that labeled white military police as young and inexperienced when dealing with black soldiers.

“Avert Riot over Ft. Sill Cop Attack,” *The Chicago Defender*, August 8, 1942, No. 54.

“Dismissal of Cop Who Beat Soldier Asked: Whites Join Criticism of Brutality in Raleigh, NC,” *The Chicago Defender*, April 19, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 52.

“Memphis Police,” *The Chicago Defender*, January 18, 1941, Vol. 36, No.39.

“Race Awaits Results of Investigation: Civilian and Military Police on Guard in Little Rock,” *The Chicago Defender*, March 28, 1942, Vol. 38, No. 49.

“Soldier gives Version of Slugging Unarmed Troopers in Arkansas,” *The Chicago Defender*, August 23, 1941, Vol. 37, No. 18.

“Soldier’s Letters Paint Dark Picture of Army ‘Democracy,’” *The Chicago Defender*, Saturday, July 19, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 13.

“Uncover New Evidence in Investigation,” *The Chicago Defender*, March 22, 1941, Vol. 36, No. 48.

The Crisis, May 1941-December 1942. Accessed through Inter-Library Loan to University of North Carolina at Asheville from Western North Carolina University, Cullowhee, North Carolina.

The Crisis served as major primary source material for political propaganda by the African-American press. Topics of conciliatory acceptance and guardianship for black rights were found. The monthly paper also introduced critics, such as southern liberals, who insisted that the behavior of black soldiers during World War II was disrupted by a faction consisting of northern Negro soldiers and the militant press. *The Crisis* defended itself and other newspapers during this time by stating that black periodicals acted independently when writing about black and white confrontations. The newspaper attacked “undemocratic” practices such as white military police brutality, segregation, and discrimination of black soldiers wearing the nation’s uniform.

“The Negro in The United States Army,” *The Crisis*, 1941, Vol. 47, National edition.

Wilkins, Roy, “We Are Accused of Inciting to Riot and Being Traitors,” *The Crisis*, Vol. 49, June, 1942.

Ottley, Roi, “Seething with Resentment,” *The New Republic* (November 10, 1941).

Pittsburgh Courier, August 1941. Accessed through Duke University in North Carolina. Microfilm

“A Soldier Writes: Sees Trouble Ahead for Boys At Fort Sill-Unbearable Discrimination Has Produced Militant Spirit,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 30, 1941, Vol. 32, No.35.

“Blood Shed Could Have Been Avoided,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 18, 1941.

“Convinced That World Interests are Associated,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 5, 1942.

“Ft. Bragg’s ‘Night of Terror’ Described,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 16, 1941.

“Hitlerism at Home,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 23, 1941, Vol. 34, No. 34.

“Major McNeer, Provost Marshal at Fort Bragg, Admits Camp is Tough--Fails to Answer Some Pointed Questions,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 21, 1941.

“What Fayetteville Leaders Said About Incidents at Fort Bragg,” *Pittsburgh Courier*, August 21, 1941, National Edition.

Prattis, P. L. “The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services of the United States.” *The*

Journal of Negro Education 12, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 355-363.

P.L. Prattis, a reporter for the *Pittsburgh Courier*, described his travels to over twenty-six military camps in the South and black soldier conditions at these camps. In this journal entry, Prattis described the murder of Private Ned Turman at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and concluded that his actions were seen as a protest to the treatment afforded to black soldiers in the military. He criticized the Army's decision to uphold bi-racial separation which most in the South sought and demanded. He reported on his visits to military camps where he saw inadequate black housing, blacks classified to service labor, and problems with white military police.

The Star of Zion, We're Still Waiting, January 01-December 1944: Accessed through Inter-Library Loan to University of North Carolina at Asheville from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Microfilm C287.8S795a

The Star of Zion was a black religious periodical distributed in Charlotte, North Carolina. This periodical addressed the struggle of African-American soldiers and civilians during World War II. It urged acceptance of the increased opportunities that African-Americans were offered in the military. The periodical consulted and gave credit to the *Pittsburgh Courier* for their campaign to address white military police action towards black soldiers prior to the murders in Fort Bragg and other military camps. *The Zion* also provided research from many articles borrowed from *The Crisis*, the monthly newspaper for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Such articles as "The Negro Press" which addressed accusations of inflammatory propaganda by African-American newspapers during the Second World War proved useful.

"Detroit Destroys Democracy," *The Star of Zion*, August 14, 1943.

Secondary Sources

Brooks, Maxwell R., PhD. *The Negro Press Re-examined: Political Context of Leading Negro Newspapers*. Boston, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1959.

Dr. Maxwell R. Brook's book was a scientific study about the expansion of the black press and the accusations of its "race-angling" reporting. "Race-angling" was the criticism that black newspapers served mainly as subversive propaganda against the government during World War II. Brooks used multiple newspapers such as *The Chicago Defender* and the *Pittsburgh Courier* to inform scholars who were interested in the black press during this period that too often writers will present papers for their own commercial purposes.

Cecelski, David S., and Tyson, Timothy B. *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

Democracy Betrayed was the first book consulted for this topic. A chapter entitled, "Wars for Democracy: African-American Militancy and Interracial Violence in North Carolina During World War II," proved valuable. Author Timothy Tyson is a professor at Duke University and has written several other books including the murder of African-American Henry Marrow and the violence that evolved from it. Tyson's theme is that violence against blacks was committed to prevent the rise of African-Americans. It discusses the Double V campaign movement which called for a second victory against Jim Crow discrimination during the Second World War. There is also mention of the fear that whites had when it came to the large numbers of armed military African-Americans in southern communities. "Wars for Democracy" provided primary sources from newspapers such as *The Crisis*, and *The Carolina Times*. This essay proved to be more of a sociological history, that is, it explained the race situation for African-Americans. It was found to be limited in seeking African-American and White reaction to what has been labeled a militant press.

Finkle, Lee. *Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II*. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975.

Forum for Protest is a major work in which Lee Finkle traced the origins of the black press, the role of African-Americans in the military, and how black civilians reacted to reports of mistreatment of their soldiers. Material was found that regarded the acceptance of equitable segregation by blacks and the attention to racial discrimination that became the norm for the press. Finkle provided material for the many exchanges between what came to be labeled as "northern agitators," northern black soldiers and newspapers such as *The Chicago Defender* and the *Pittsburgh Courier*. He compared them with those in the South who wanted slow and progressive change in the status of African-Americans.

Flynn, George Q. "Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II," *Journal of Negro History* 69, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 14-25. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/.

George Q. Flynn was a History professor at Texas Tech University. Although the Army had instituted a ten percent quota for black enlistments in the military, it was both segregation and discrimination which kept their participation at five percent in all branches. To present the argument, Flynn used individuals such as Franklin D. Roosevelt who demanded that the Marines and Navy, two branches of the service who blatantly rejected most African-American draftees, meet the quota. This journal provided the argument that African-Americans were promised equal entry into the military, but it was requested with much discrimination from government and military officials.

Hall, E. T. Jr. "Race Prejudice and Negro-White Relations in the Army." *The American Journal of Sociology* 52, no.5 (March, 1947): 401-409. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/.

E.T. Hall, Jr., was a professor at University of Denver. Hall wrote that racial issues in the military revolved around the patterns established in everyday American life. To present his argument, E.T. Hall stated that the Army did not consider personal opinion about black soldiers by southerners and southern officers. He described encounters of racial stereotypes and discrimination on three fronts: the United States, Europe and the South West Pacific. He concluded that racial issues in the Army were never solved because of different personalities and varying economic classes.

Kryder, Daniel. *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Daniel Kryder's, *Divided Arsenal*, looked at how the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration used policies to temporarily ease racial tensions in the military. The book argued that in no way did the Roosevelt administration aim for long-enduring policy changes in the status of blacks, but instead opted for a short appeasement of the minority in order to hold power during the election of 1940.

Lee, Ulysses. *The Employment of Negro Troops – The United States Army in World War II*. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army, 1966.

Ulysses Lee's, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, focused on bringing attention to “the experience of the Army in dealing with the important national question: this being the full use of the ten percent national population that was the African-American.” Lee's credibility in writing the volume was his experience as a member of the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1946-1952. After World War II, he served as a military specialist on African-Americans in the Army. Lee's work is extensive in quantitative methods that presented the African-American position and numbers in all military branches. Lee emphasized that segregation had been a long-established tradition. Any experimentation in integration would erode the morale of all troops and jeopardize the integrity of the military south of the Mason-Dixon Line. The book introduced how the post-World War I military viewed African-American performance in training and in battles. Lee concluded that the Army's ten percent quota was politically acceptable as it did not lessen black support for the war, but it kept blacks in non-threatening service positions. *The Employment of Troops* also illustrated that it was only later in the war that blacks became the aggressor in civilian riots, perhaps spurred on by militant newspapers. Lee described newspapers such as *The Crisis* which introduced arguments on whether to continue to pressure for equal opportunities in the military or to serve side by side with whites regardless of equitable positions for blacks.

Morehouse, Maggi M. *Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II*. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2000.

When writing this piece, Maggi Morehouse was inspired by her father who was serving in the United States Army with a black integrated unit. It was only after collecting her data and

personally interviewing her father and others that she decided this book would be dedicated to African-American soldiers who served in World War II. The book addressed the belief that African-American soldiers were incompetent fighters. This was due to their unfair treatment and training during World War I. She reported in her book about the relocation of many black soldiers to a Jim Crow-prone South and the adjustment to these new customs and local laws.

Motley, Mary Penick. *The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987.

Mary Penick Motley's *The Invisible Soldier* utilized oral methodology to expose the United States system of segregation in the Armed Forces. Accounts not only depicted conflicts in racism, but also provided an intimate picture of U.S. African-American soldiers. Motley's intended audience was the general public as the book lacked any mention of policies or other factors affecting segregation and African-Americans.

Mershon, Sherrie, and Schlossman, Steven. *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Foxholes and Color Lines began as a project to provide the Department of Defense with information and analyses that could be applied to the making of policies regarding homosexuals in the military. To do this, Mershon and Schlossman reported that the innovation of policies that affected segregation during World War II would be closely studied. *Foxholes and Color Lines* emphasized that segregation was a political conflict, and African-Americans were one of several groups that used moral support of the war to affect policy changes relative to military discrimination. The highlighted some of the public resistance to military changes by both blacks and whites. The book stressed that military changes followed a timetable, but it was resistant white officers who were slow to enact policies or avoided them altogether. Lastly, *Foxholes and Color Lines* discussed segregation from the military point of view, this being that segregation was the social norm and was upheld by federal laws. The military would not be held responsible for any future changes.⁷⁹ As for sources, both Mershon and Schlossman advised the reader that their material incorporated mostly secondary sources and utilized very little primary source material.

Sitkoff, Harvard. *Remaking Dixie: The Impact of World War II on the American South; African-American Militancy in the World War II South, Another Perspective*. University Press of Mississippi/Jackson, 1997.

⁷⁹ Mershon, Sherrie and Schlossman, Steven, *Foxholes and Color line.; Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore and London. The John Hopkins University Press). 21-23.

This essay stated that most reports generalized the black press as overly dramatic and militant. Sitkoff pointed out that the majority of the southern press and NAACP branches took no major action against discrimination and segregation in the military during World War II. His primary examples focused on the failure of Philip Randolph's "March on Washington" and the southern press not publishing militant content in their pages. To uphold his argument, he stated that most African-American social groups were too concerned with economic advances and moves for equitable facilities and salaries.

Thompson, Charles H. "The Basis of Negro Morale in World War II." *The Journal of Negro Education* 11, no. 4 (October 1942): 454-464. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/.

This commencement address by soldier and educator, Charles H. Thompson, compared the situation of black soldiers during World Wars I and II. His theme defined three parts: (1) African-American status in both wars; (2) black methods of protest; (3) fundamental improvements to morale. He differentiated the change from "Hewers of wood and water" to a more equitable entry into the Armed Forces. He also acknowledged the increase of black officers in the Army. This short commencement essay was helpful in pointing out that blacks during World War II could not make their demands too overt or they would face violence and the accusation of disunity.

Washburn, Patrick S. *A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black Press During World War II*. New York. Oxford University Press, 1986.

Author Patrick S. Washburn, explained that his book was inspired while he investigated a meeting by the U.S. Government that concerned the possible indictment of several African-American press organizations for sedition. The book is centered on Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attorney General, Francis Biddle, and his fight to uphold civil liberties and to discuss cases of sedition against the black press. Other books focused more on black editorials and newspaper content during World War II, but Washburn's chief purpose was to highlight the sedition charges. In listing sources for newspapers that were considered for sedition, Washburn mentioned the influential *Pittsburgh Courier*. Washburn's interviews with its executive editor John H. Sengtake gave a personal view of how the government did not want black reporters anywhere near military reservations and camps.